04291nam 22007572 450 991078598780332120151005020621.01-316-08981-91-139-57953-31-283-63766-91-139-57005-61-107-25444-21-139-57271-71-139-10855-71-139-56915-51-139-57096-X(CKB)2670000000261210(EBL)1025045(OCoLC)815389321(SSID)ssj0000722739(PQKBManifestationID)11464737(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000722739(PQKBWorkID)10697122(PQKB)10744978(MiAaPQ)EBC1025045(UkCbUP)CR9781139108553(Au-PeEL)EBL1025045(CaPaEBR)ebr10608420(CaONFJC)MIL395012(OCoLC)820833256(EXLCZ)99267000000026121020141103d2012|||| uy| 0engur|||||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierMultiethnic coalitions in Africa business financing of opposition election campaigns /Leonardo R. Arriola[electronic resource]Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,2012.1 online resource (xvii, 304 pages) digital, PDF file(s)Cambridge studies in comparative politicsTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).1-107-60543-1 1-107-02111-1 Includes bibliographical references and index.The puzzle of opposition coordination -- A theory of pecuniary coalition formation -- The emergence of financial reprisal regimes -- The political control of banking -- The liberalization of capital -- The political alignment of business -- Opposition bargaining across ethnic cleavages -- Multiethnic opposition coalitions in African elections -- Democratic consolidation in Africa -- Appendix A: Commercial banking sector size and opposition coalitions in Africa -- Appendix B: Sources on commodity exports and ethnic production by country -- Appendix C: Variables: definitions, sources, and summary statistics -- Appendix D: Multiethnic opposition coalitions in Africa, 1990-2005.Why are politicians able to form electoral coalitions that bridge ethnic divisions in some countries and not others? This book answers this question by presenting a theory of pecuniary coalition building in multi-ethnic countries governed through patronage. Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, the book explains how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital affects political bargaining among opposition politicians in particular. While incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure cross-ethnic endorsements, opposition politicians must rely on the private resources of business to do the same. This book combines cross-national analyses of African countries with in-depth case studies of Cameroon and Kenya to show that incumbents actively manipulate financial controls to prevent business from supporting their opposition. It demonstrates that opposition politicians are more likely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages once incumbents have lost their ability to blackmail the business sector through financial reprisals.Cambridge studies in comparative politics.Opposition (Political science)Africa, Sub-SaharanElectoral coalitionsAfrica, Sub-SaharanCampaign fundsAfrica, Sub-SaharanAfrica, Sub-SaharanEthnic relationsPolitical aspectsAfrica, Sub-SaharanPolitics and government1960-KenyaPolitics and governmentCameroonPolitics and governmentOpposition (Political science)Electoral coalitionsCampaign funds324.70967Arriola Leonardo R(Leonardo Rafael),1536779UkCbUPUkCbUPBOOK9910785987803321Multiethnic coalitions in Africa3785699UNINA