02924nam 2200673 a 450 991078523650332120230721013602.01-282-87576-097866128757621-4411-7183-5(CKB)2670000000055027(EBL)601745(OCoLC)676698315(SSID)ssj0001145063(PQKBManifestationID)12499576(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001145063(PQKBWorkID)11118641(PQKB)10286451(SSID)ssj0000418091(PQKBManifestationID)11288473(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000418091(PQKBWorkID)10369119(PQKB)11592745(MiAaPQ)EBC601745(Au-PeEL)EBL601745(CaPaEBR)ebr10427313(CaONFJC)MIL287576(OCoLC)893335167(EXLCZ)99267000000005502720090319d2008 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrFreedom, teleology, and evil[electronic resource] /Stewart GoetzLondon ;New York, NY Continuumc20081 online resource (225 p.)Continuum studies in philosophy of religionDescription based upon print version of record.1-4411-8769-3 1-84706-481-7 Includes bibliographical references (p. [205]-212) and indexes.Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Noncausal Agency; 3 Noncausal Agency and its Critics; 4 Noncausal Agency and Problems of Luck; 5 The Principle of Alternative Possibilities; 6 Self-forming Choices, Life Plans, and the Problem of Evil; Notes; Bibliography; Subject Index; Name IndexIn Freedom, Teleology, and Evil Stewart Goetz defends the existence of libertarian freedom of the will. He argues that choices are essentially uncaused events with teleological explanations in the form of reasons or purposes. Because choices are uncaused events with teleological explanations, whenever agents choose they are free to choose otherwise. Given this freedom to choose otherwise, agents are morally responsible for how they choose. Thus, Goetz advocates and defends the principle of alternative possibilities which states that agents are morally responsible for a choice only if thContinuum studies in philosophy of religion.Free will and determinismReligious aspectsChristianityTheodicyFree will and determinismReligious aspectsChristianity.Theodicy.123/.5.Goetz Stewart856131MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910785236503321Freedom, teleology, and evil3698193UNINA