03730nam 22007212 450 991078486650332120220927193157.01-107-17440-61-281-24326-4978661124326597805113787200-511-37783-50-511-37692-80-511-37598-00-511-37448-80-511-49172-70-511-37872-6(CKB)1000000000403728(EBL)328894(OCoLC)437197071(SSID)ssj0000212719(PQKBManifestationID)11196718(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000212719(PQKBWorkID)10139820(PQKB)11180290(UkCbUP)CR9780511491726(MiAaPQ)EBC328894(Au-PeEL)EBL328894(CaPaEBR)ebr10221582(CaONFJC)MIL124326(PPN)197502180(EXLCZ)99100000000040372820090302d2007|||| uy 0engur|||||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierThe nuclear taboo the United States and the non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945 /Nina TannenwaldCambridge :Cambridge University Press,2007.1 online resource (xiii, 449 pages) digital, PDF file(s)Cambridge studies in international relations ;87Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).0-521-52428-8 0-521-81886-9 Includes bibliographical references and index.1. Introduction: the tradition of nuclear non-use -- 2. Explaining non-use -- 3. Hiroshima and the origins of the nuclear taboo -- 4. The Korean War: the emerging taboo -- 5. The rise of the nuclear taboo, 1953-1960 -- 6. Nuclear weapons and the Vietnam War -- 7. Institutionalizing the taboo, 1960-1989 -- 8. The 1991 Gulf War -- 9. The taboo in the post-Cold War world -- 10. Conclusion: the prospects for the nuclear taboo.Why have nuclear weapons not been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945? Nina Tannenwald disputes the conventional answer of 'deterrence' in favour of what she calls a nuclear taboo - a widespread inhibition on using nuclear weapons - which has arisen in global politics. Drawing on newly released archival sources, Tannenwald traces the rise of the nuclear taboo, the forces that produced it, and its influence, particularly on US leaders. She analyzes four critical instances where US leaders considered using nuclear weapons (Japan 1945, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War 1991) and examines how the nuclear taboo has repeatedly dissuaded US and other world leaders from resorting to these 'ultimate weapons'. Through a systematic analysis, Tannenwald challenges conventional conceptions of deterrence and offers a compelling argument on the moral bases of nuclear restraint as well as an important insight into how nuclear war can be avoided in the future.Cambridge studies in international relations ;87.Nuclear arms controlNuclear weaponsGovernment policyUnited StatesNuclear nonproliferationGovernment policyUnited StatesNuclear arms control.Nuclear weaponsGovernment policyNuclear nonproliferationGovernment policy355.02170973Tannenwald Nina1574327UkCbUPUkCbUPBOOK9910784866503321The nuclear taboo3850563UNINA