03565nam 22006972 450 991078441350332120151005020621.01-107-14482-51-280-44948-90-511-18544-80-511-18461-10-511-18724-60-511-31341-10-511-61087-40-511-18631-2(CKB)1000000000353713(EBL)256658(OCoLC)171138436(SSID)ssj0000137389(PQKBManifestationID)11151431(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000137389(PQKBWorkID)10088312(PQKB)11692165(UkCbUP)CR9780511610875(Au-PeEL)EBL256658(CaPaEBR)ebr10124737(CaONFJC)MIL44948(OCoLC)80246606(MiAaPQ)EBC256658(EXLCZ)99100000000035371320090910d2004|||| uy| 0engur|||||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierDesigning federalism a theory of self-sustainable federal institutions /Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, Olga Shvetsova[electronic resource]Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,2004.1 online resource (xii, 384 pages) digital, PDF file(s)Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).0-521-01648-7 0-521-81618-1 Includes bibliographical references (p. 337-365) and indexes.Cover; Half-title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Figures; Tables; Preface; Acknowledgments; 1 Federations and the Theoretical Problem; 2 Federal Bargaining; 3 Two Cases of Uninstitutionalized Bargaining; 4 Representation; 5 Incentives; 6 Political Parties in a Federal State; 7 Institutional Sources of Federal Stability I; 8 Institutional Sources of Federal Stability II; 9 Designing Federalism; References; Name Index; Subject IndexBecause of the redistributive nature of institutions and the availability of implementable alternatives with different distributive consequences, the desire of federation members to change institutional specifics in their favor is a permanent feature of the federal political process. This is so for two reasons. First, states or their equivalents in democratic federations usually can succeed in renegotiating the rules if they feel sufficiently motivated to do so. Second, in the case of a federation it is more or less clear who stands to benefit from any change in institutions. Thus, the existence of an equilibrium of constitutional legitimacy at the popular and elite levels cannot be taken for granted. The authors show that the presence in the political process of agents who are 'naturally committed' to the status-quo institutional arrangement can suffice to coordinate voters to act as if they support existing constitutional arrangements.Federal governmentComparative governmentWorld politics1989-Federal government.Comparative government.World politics321.02/3Filippov Mikhail1522413Ordeshook Peter C.1942-Shvetsova Olga(Olga Vitalievna),UkCbUPUkCbUPBOOK9910784413503321Designing federalism3762088UNINA