03401nam 2200673Ia 450 991078273020332120230912144322.01-282-85446-197866128544600-7735-6656-210.1515/9780773566569(CKB)1000000000713446(SSID)ssj0000279759(PQKBManifestationID)11223286(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000279759(PQKBWorkID)10268454(PQKB)10038538(CaPaEBR)400824(Au-PeEL)EBL3331105(CaPaEBR)ebr10141776(CaONFJC)MIL285446(OCoLC)929121262(VaAlCD)20.500.12592/6bb3r4(schport)gibson_crkn/2009-12-01/1/400824(MiAaPQ)EBC3331105(DE-B1597)656908(DE-B1597)9780773566569(MiAaPQ)EBC3245451(EXLCZ)99100000000071344619981029d1997 uy 0engurcn|||||||||txtccrThe future's back[electronic resource] nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War /Frank P. HarveyMontreal McGill-Queen's University Pressc1997xvi, 192 p. ill. ;24 cmBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph0-7735-1606-9 0-7735-1605-0 Includes bibliographical references (p. [171]-188) and index.Front Matter -- Contents -- Tables and Figures -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Cumulation in International Relations: Methodological Constraints and Solutions -- Nuclear Deterrence: The Record of Aggregate Testing -- New Directions for Aggregate Testing -- Game Theory and Superpower Rivalry: 1948–88 -- U.S.-Soviet Rivalry and Nuclear Deterrence -- Nuclear Stability after the Cold War -- Conventional Deterrence and Compellence Theory: Perspectives on Testing after the Cold War -- Notes -- Bibliography -- IndexArguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are not convincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses the crisis management techniques used by the United States and the Soviet Union in twenty-eight post-war crises and isolates factors that promote or inhibit escalation of these crises. This "crises"-based data set serves as the basis for identifying patterns of response when one nuclear state is threatened by another. The Future's Back offers new directions for testing that emphasize a more unified approach to theory building and assesses the feasibility of alternative courses of action to prevent escalation of future disputes characterized by nuclear rivalry.Deterrence (Strategy)Nuclear warfareWorld politics1989-Deterrence (Strategy)Nuclear warfare.World politics327.1/747Harvey Frank P573670MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910782730203321The future's back3680270UNINA