03791nam 22007332 450 991078261750332120151005020622.01-107-19182-31-283-33043-11-139-13494-997866133304370-511-80459-81-139-12990-21-139-13383-70-511-50495-00-511-50709-7(CKB)1000000000719039(EBL)424515(OCoLC)437109998(SSID)ssj0000358487(PQKBManifestationID)11278134(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000358487(PQKBWorkID)10359771(PQKB)11203477(UkCbUP)CR9780511804595(Au-PeEL)EBL424515(CaPaEBR)ebr10289144(CaONFJC)MIL333043(MiAaPQ)EBC424515(EXLCZ)99100000000071903920101021d2009|||| uy| 0engur|||||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierCrime and culpability a theory of criminal law /by Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan with contributions by Stephen J. Morse[electronic resource]Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,2009.1 online resource (xiii, 358 pages) digital, PDF file(s)Cambridge introductions to philosophy and lawTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).0-521-73961-6 0-521-51877-6 Includes bibliographical references (p. 331-348) and index.Part One. Introduction : retributivism and the criminal law. Criminal law, punishment, and desert -- Part Two. The culpable choice. The essence of culpability : acts manifesting insufficient concern for the legally protected interests of others ; Negligence ; Defeaters of culpability -- Part Three. The culpable act. Only culpability, not resulting harm, affects desert ; When are inchoate crimes culpable and why? ; The locus of culpability -- Part Four. A proposed code. What a culpability-based criminal code might look like.This book presents a comprehensive overview of what the criminal law would look like if organised around the principle that those who deserve punishment should receive punishment commensurate with, but no greater than, that which they deserve. Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan argue that desert is a function of the actor's culpability, and that culpability is a function of the risks of harm to protected interests that the actor believes he is imposing and his reasons for acting in the face of those risks. The authors deny that resultant harms, as well as unperceived risks, affect the actor's desert. They thus reject punishment for inadvertent negligence as well as for intentions or preparatory acts that are not risky. Alexander and Ferzan discuss the reasons for imposing risks that negate or mitigate culpability, the individuation of crimes, and omissions.Cambridge introductions to philosophy and law.Crime & CulpabilityPunishmentPhilosophyCriminal lawPhilosophyCriminal lawUnited StatesPhilosophyPunishmentPhilosophy.Criminal lawPhilosophy.Criminal lawPhilosophy.345/.001Alexander Larry1943-285683Ferzan Kimberly Kessler1971-Morse Stephen J.UkCbUPUkCbUPBOOK9910782617503321Crime and culpability3849117UNINA