03375nam 2200649Ia 450 991078107290332120240116152718.00-19-160946-30-19-180983-71-282-46581-397866124658190-19-157291-8(CKB)2550000000006680(EBL)480654(OCoLC)536370649(SSID)ssj0000344629(PQKBManifestationID)11301480(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000344629(PQKBWorkID)10306975(PQKB)10612992(StDuBDS)EDZ0001138883(MiAaPQ)EBC480654(Au-PeEL)EBL480654(CaPaEBR)ebr10362190(CaONFJC)MIL246581(MiAaPQ)EBC7036249(Au-PeEL)EBL7036249(EXLCZ)99255000000000668020090907d2010 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrThe world in the head[electronic resource] /Robert CumminsOxford Oxford University Pressc20101 online resource (339 p.)Description based upon print version of record.0-19-954804-8 0-19-954803-X Includes bibliographical references and index.Contents; 1. What is it Like to be a Computer?; 2. The LOT of the Causal Theory of Mental Content; 3. Systematicity; 4. Systematicity and the Cognition of Structured Domains; 5. Methodological Reflections on Belief; 6. Inexplicit Information; 7. Representation and Indication; 8. Representation and Unexploited Content; 9. Haugeland on Representation and Intentionality; 10. Truth and Meaning; 11. Meaning and Content in Cognitive Science; 12. Representational Specialization: The Synthetic A Priori Revisited; 13. Biological Preparedness and Evolutionary Explanation14. Cognitive Evolutionary Psychology Without Representational Nativism15. Connectionism and the Rationale Constraint on Cognitive Explanation; 16. 'How does it Work?' vs. 'What are the Laws?': Two Conceptions of Psychological Explanation; Bibliography; Name Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; Q; R; S; T; V; W; Y; Subject Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; L; M; N; O; P; R; S; T; U; VThe World in the Head collects the best of Robert Cummins' papers on mental representation and psychological explanation. Running through these papers are a pair of themes: that explaining the mind requires functional analysis, not subsumption under ""psychological laws"", and that the propositional attitudes--belief, desire, intention--and their interactions, while real, are not the key to understanding the mind at a fundamental level. Taking these ideas seriously putsconsiderable strain on standard conceptions of rationality and reasoning, on truth-conditional semantics, and on our interpretMental representationPhilosophy of mindMental representation.Philosophy of mind.128.2Cummins Robert1944-53657MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910781072903321The world in the head3740695UNINA