05586oam 22011654 450 991077964240332120230802010330.01-4755-7345-61-4755-9735-5(CKB)2550000001041548(EBL)1607090(SSID)ssj0000943241(PQKBManifestationID)11523885(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943241(PQKBWorkID)10975476(PQKB)11100227(MiAaPQ)EBC1607090(Au-PeEL)EBL1607090(CaPaEBR)ebr10661239(OCoLC)820489716(IMF)WPIEE2012285(IMF)WPIEA2012285(EXLCZ)99255000000104154820020129d2012 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrPension Reforms in Japan /Kenichiro Kashiwase, Masahiro Nozaki, Kiichi TokuokaWashington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2012.1 online resource (22 p.)IMF Working PapersDescription based upon print version of record.1-4755-7680-3 1-4755-4431-6 Includes bibliographical references.Cover; Abstract; Contents; I. Introduction; Figures; 1. Japan: Population Aging in Japan and OECD Countries; 2. Japan: Social Security Spending; II. The Pension System and Past Reforms in Japan; 3. Japan: Public Pension System; 4. Japan: NP and EPI Pension Spending and Contributions, 2010-2100; Boxes; 1. Japan: How Does Macro Indexing Work?; III. Pension Reform Options to Reduce the Fiscal Burden; Tables; 1. Japan: Options to Reduce Government for Basic Pension; 2. Japan: Growth Impact of Pension Reform Options; A. Raise Pension Eligibility Age5. Japan: Life Expectancy after Pension Eligibility Age, 2000-20306. OECD Countries: Pension Eligibility Age and Life Expectancy in 2010 and 2030; B. Lower Replacement Ratio; 7. Pension Benefit Replacement Rate for Single Earner Couples; 3. Japan: Old-age Poverty in Japan and the Role of Pensions; C. Higher Contribution Rates; 8. Pension Contribution Rate, 2009; D. Reducing Preferential Treatments; IV. Conclusion; Appendices; I. Methodologies to Calculate Fiscal Savings from Reform Options; ReferencesThis paper analyzes various reform options for Japan’s public pension in light of large fiscal consolidation needs of the country. The most attractive option is to increase the pension eligibility age in line with high and rising life expectancy. This would have a positive effect on long-run economic growth and would be relatively fair in sharing the burden of fiscal adjustment between younger and older generations. Other attractive options include better targeting by “clawing back” a small portion of pension benefits from wealthy retirees, reducing preferential tax treatment of pension benefit incomes, and collecting contributions from dependent spouses of employees, who are currently eligible for pension benefits even though they make no contributions. These options, if implemented concurrently, could reduce the government annual subsidy and the government deficit by up to 1¼ percent of GDP by 2020.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2012/285PensionsJapanRetirement incomeJapanLaborimfMacroeconomicsimfPublic FinanceimfDemographyimfFiscal PolicyimfSocial Security and Public PensionsimfDemographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and ForecastsimfNonwage Labor Costs and BenefitsimfPrivate PensionsimfEconomics of the ElderlyimfEconomics of the HandicappedimfNon-labor Market DiscriminationimfAggregate Factor Income DistributionimfPensionsimfPopulation & demographyimfPension spendingimfAgingimfIncomeimfPension reformimfExpenditureimfPopulation and demographicsimfNational accountsimfPopulation agingimfJapanimfPensionsRetirement incomeLaborMacroeconomicsPublic FinanceDemographyFiscal PolicySocial Security and Public PensionsDemographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and ForecastsNonwage Labor Costs and BenefitsPrivate PensionsEconomics of the ElderlyEconomics of the HandicappedNon-labor Market DiscriminationAggregate Factor Income DistributionPensionsPopulation & demographyPension spendingAgingIncomePension reformExpenditurePopulation and demographicsNational accountsPopulation agingKashiwase Kenichiro1462100Nozaki Masahiro1462073Tokuoka Kiichi1476613DcWaIMFBOOK9910779642403321Pension Reforms in Japan3691355UNINA