01310nam a2200265 i 4500991001020389707536050512s2003 it 100 0 ita d8834831829b13308026-39ule_instDip.to Studi Giuridiciita342.023 Piccolo Stato, Costituzione e connessioni internazionali :atti del convegno dell'Associazione di diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo : San Marino, Collegio Santa Chiara, 21-22 giugno 2002 /a cura e con prefazione di Guido Guidi ; presentazione di Giuseppe F. Ferrari Torino :G. Giappichelli,2003303 p. ;24 cmDiritto pubblico comparato ed europeo.Convegni ;1Stati minoriCongressiSan Marino2002 Guidi, GuidoFerrari, Giuseppe F..b1330802628-06-1212-05-05991001020389707536LE027 342.02 GUI01.0112027000100125le027gE31.00-l- 00000.i1406660912-05-05LE021 342.02 GUI01.0112020000042105le021pE31.00-n- 00000.i1542915528-06-12Piccolo Stato, Costituzione e connessioni internazionali927415UNISALENTOle027le02012-05-05ma -itait 0005061nam 2200757Ia 450 991077911480332120200520144314.00-8014-6531-11-322-50357-50-8014-6575-310.7591/9780801465758(CKB)2550000000105282(OCoLC)808344445(CaPaEBR)ebrary10580603(SSID)ssj0000702874(PQKBManifestationID)11410804(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000702874(PQKBWorkID)10687438(PQKB)10855487(StDuBDS)EDZ0001500160(MiAaPQ)EBC3138352(OCoLC)966854688(MdBmJHUP)muse51813(DE-B1597)478402(OCoLC)979740510(DE-B1597)9780801465758(Au-PeEL)EBL3138352(CaPaEBR)ebr10580603(CaONFJC)MIL681639(EXLCZ)99255000000010528220120206d2012 uy 0engur|||||||||||txtccrAtomic assistance[electronic resource] how "atoms for peace" programs cause nuclear insecurity /Matthew FuhrmannIthaca Cornell University Press20121 online resource (340 p.) Cornell studies in security affairsBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph0-8014-5090-X 0-8014-7811-1 Includes bibliographical references and index.Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Tables and Figures -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- List of Abbreviations -- Introduction: Unintended Consequences in International Politics -- 1. Definitions and Patterns of Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation -- Part I. Atoms for Peace -- 2. Economic Statecraft and Atoms for Peace: A Theory of Peaceful Nuclear Assistance -- 3. The Historical Record: A First Cut -- 4. Nuclear Arms and Influence: Assisting India, Iran, and Libya -- 5. The Thirst for Oil and Other Motives: Nine Puzzling Cases of Assistance -- 6. Oil for Peaceful Nuclear Assistance? -- Part II. Atoms for War -- 7. Spreading Temptation: Why Nuclear Export Strategies Backfire -- 8. Who Builds Bombs? How Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Facilitates the Spread of Nuclear Weapons -- 9. Have International Institutions Made the World Safer? -- Conclusion: What Peaceful Nuclear Assistance Teaches Us about International Relations -- Notes -- IndexNuclear technology is dual use in nature, meaning that it can be used to produce nuclear energy or to build nuclear weapons. Despite security concerns about proliferation, the United States and other nuclear nations have regularly shared with other countries nuclear technology, materials, and knowledge for peaceful purposes. In Atomic Assistance, Matthew Fuhrmann argues that governments use peaceful nuclear assistance as a tool of economic statecraft. Nuclear suppliers hope that they can reap the benefits of foreign aid-improving relationships with their allies, limiting the influence of their adversaries, enhancing their energy security by gaining favorable access to oil supplies-without undermining their security. By providing peaceful nuclear assistance, however, countries inadvertently help spread nuclear weapons. Fuhrmann draws on several cases of "Atoms for Peace," including U.S. civilian nuclear assistance to Iran from 1957 to 1979; Soviet aid to Libya from 1975 to 1986; French, Italian, and Brazilian nuclear exports to Iraq from 1975 to 1981; and U.S. nuclear cooperation with India from 2001 to 2008. He also explores decision making in countries such as Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, and Syria to determine why states began (or did not begin) nuclear weapons programs and why some programs succeeded while others failed. Fuhrmann concludes that, on average, countries receiving higher levels of peaceful nuclear assistance are more likely to pursue and acquire the bomb-especially if they experience an international crisis after receiving aid.Cornell studies in security affairs.Nuclear nonproliferationInternational cooperationNuclear industryInternational cooperationTechnology transferInternational cooperationTechnical assistanceInternational cooperationSecurity, InternationalNuclear nonproliferationInternational cooperation.Nuclear industryInternational cooperation.Technology transferInternational cooperation.Technical assistanceInternational cooperation.Security, International.327.1/747Fuhrmann Matthew1980-1479296MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910779114803321Atomic assistance3766701UNINA