06226nam 22009733u 450 991077821860332120210111230237.01-282-25913-X97866122591351-4008-3036-2(CKB)1000000000788553(EBL)457805(OCoLC)439825977(SSID)ssj0000114159(PQKBManifestationID)11139070(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000114159(PQKBWorkID)10102028(PQKB)11573394(SSID)ssj0001153761(PQKBManifestationID)11758431(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001153761(PQKBWorkID)11153704(PQKB)11687643(MiAaPQ)EBC457805(PPN)170232042(EXLCZ)99100000000078855320131216d2009|||| u|| |engur|n|---|||||txtccrThe Bounds of Reason[electronic resource] Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral SciencesPrinceton Princeton University Press20091 online resource (305 p.)Description based upon print version of record.0-691-16084-8 0-691-14052-9 Cover; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; 1 Decision Theory and Human Behavior; 1.1 Beliefs, Preferences, and Constraints; 1.2 The Meaning of Rational Action; 1.3 Why Are Preferences Consistent?; 1.4 Time Inconsistency; 1.5 Bayesian Rationality and Subjective Priors; 1.6 The Biological Basis for Expected Utility; 1.7 The Allais and Ellsberg Paradoxes; 1.8 Risk and the Shape of the Utility Function; 1.9 Prospect Theory; 1.10 Heuristics and Biases in Decision Making; 2 Game Theory: Basic Concepts; 2.1 The Extensive Form; 2.2 The Normal Form; 2.3 Mixed Strategies; 2.4 Nash Equilibrium2.5 The Fundamental Theorem of Game Theory2.6 Solving for Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria; 2.7 Throwing Fingers; 2.8 The Battle of the Sexes; 2.9 The Hawk- Dove Game; 2.10 The Prisoner's Dilemma; 2.11 Alice, Bob, and the Choreographer; 2.12 An Efficiency-Enhancing Choreographer; 2.13 The Correlated Equilibrium Solution Concept; 3 Game Theory and Human Behavior; 3.1 Self- and Other-Regarding Preferences; 3.2 Methodological Issues in Behavioral Game Theory; 3.3 An Anonymous Market Exchange; 3.4 The Rationality of Altruistic Giving; 3.5 Conditional Altruistic Cooperation3.6 Altruistic Punishment3.7 Strong Reciprocity in the Labor Market; 3.8 Altruistic Third-Party Punishment; 3.9 Altruism and Cooperation in Groups; 3.10 Inequality Aversion; 3.11 The Trust Game; 3.12 Character Virtues; 3.13 The Situational Character of Preferences; 3.14 The Dark Side of Altruistic Cooperation; 3.15 Norms of Cooperation: Cross-Cultural Variation; 4 Rationalizability and Common Knowledge of Rationality; 4.1 Epistemic Games; 4.2 A Simple Epistemic Game; 4.3 An Epistemic Battle of the Sexes; 4.4 Dominated and Iteratedly Dominated Strategies4.5 Eliminating Weakly Dominated Strategies4.6 Rationalizable Strategies; 4.7 Eliminating Strongly Dominated Strategies; 4.8 Common Knowledge of Rationality; 4.9 Rationalizability and Common Knowledge of Rationality; 4.10 The Beauty Contest; 4.11 The Traveler's Dilemma; 4.12 The Modified Traveler's Dilemma; 4.13 Global Games; 4.14 CKR Is an Event, Not a Premise; 5 Extensive Form Rationalizability; 5.1 Backward Induction and Dominated Strategies; 5.2 Subgame Perfection; 5.3 Subgame Perfection and Incredible Threats; 5.4 The Surprise Examination; 5.5 The Common Knowledge of Logicality Paradox5.6 The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma5.7 The Centipede Game; 5.8 CKR Fails Off the Backward Induction Path; 5.9 How to Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma; 5.10 The Modal Logic of Knowledge; 5.11 Backward Induction and Extensive Form CKR; 5.12 Rationality and Extensive Form CKR; 5.13 On the Nonexistence of CKR; 6 The Mixing Problem: Purification and Conjectures; 6.1 Why Play Mixed Strategies?; 6.2 Harsanyi's Purification Theorem; 6.3 A Reputational Model of Honesty and Corruption; 6.4 Purifying Honesty and Corruption; 6.5 Epistemic Games: Mixed Strategies as Conjectures6.6 Resurrecting the Conjecture Approach to Purification Game theory is central to understanding human behavior and relevant to all of the behavioral sciences--from biology and economics, to anthropology and political science. However, as The Bounds of Reason demonstrates, game theory alone cannot fully explain human behavior and should instead complement other key concepts championed by the behavioral disciplines. Herbert Gintis shows that just as game theory without broader social theory is merely technical bravado, so social theory without game theory is a handicapped enterprise. Gintis illustrates, for instance, that game theorGame theoryHuman behaviorPractical reasonPsychologySocial sciences --MethodologyGame theoryMethodologyPractical reasonHuman behaviorSocial sciencesPsychologyBusiness & EconomicsHILCCEconomic TheoryHILCCMathematicsHILCCPhysical Sciences & MathematicsHILCCAlgebraHILCCGame theory.Human behavior.Practical reason.Psychology.Social sciences --Methodology.Game theoryMethodologyPractical reasonHuman behaviorSocial sciencesPsychologyBusiness & EconomicsEconomic TheoryMathematicsPhysical Sciences & MathematicsAlgebra519.3Gintis Herbert147648AU-PeELAU-PeELAU-PeELBOOK9910778218603321The Bounds of Reason3861444UNINA