02126oam 22004093a 450 991070332020332120230622022912.0(NBER)w1838(CKB)3240000000026014(OCoLC)696173860(EXLCZ)99324000000002601420230622d1986 fy 0engurcnu||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierElections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles /Kenneth Rogoff, Anne SibertCambridge, MassNational Bureau of Economic Research1986[Washington, D.C.] :[Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System],[1985]1 online resourceillustrations (black and white);NBER working paper seriesno. w1838February 1986.Includes bibliographical references (pages 35-36).There is an extensive empirical literature on political business cycles, but its theoretical foundations are grounded in pre-rational expectations macroeconomic theory. Here we show that electoral cycles in taxes, government spending and money growth can be modeled as an equilibrium signaling process. The cycleis driven by temporary information asymmetries which can arise if, for example,the government has more current information on its performance in providing for national defense. Incumbents cheat least when their private informationis either extremely favorable or extremely unfavorable. An exogenous increase in the incumbent partyts popularity does not necessarily imply a damped policy cycle.Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)no. w1838.ElectionsEconomic aspectsElectionsEconomic aspects.Rogoff Kenneth324217Sibert Anne1366014National Bureau of Economic Research.MaCbNBERMaCbNBERBOOK9910703320203321Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles3388458UNINA