02421oam 22004213a 450 991070292630332120230622022755.0(NBER)w8851(CKB)3240000000019277(OCoLC)681741952(EXLCZ)99324000000001927720230622d2002 fy 0engurcnu||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierRicardian Equivalence with Incomplete Household Risk Sharing /Shinichi Nishiyama, Kent SmettersCambridge, MassNational Bureau of Economic Research2002Washington, DC :Congressional Budget Office,[2002]1 online resourceillustrations (black and white);NBER working paper seriesno. w8851March 2002.Includes bibliographical references.Several important empirical studies (e.g., Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff, 1992, 1996, 1997) find that households are not altruistically-linked in a way consistent with the standard Ricardian model, as put forward by Barro (1974). We build a two-sided altruistic-linkage model in which private transfers are made in the presence of two types of shocks: an 'observable' shock that is public information (e.g., public redistribution) and an 'unobservable' shock that is private information (e.g., idiosyncratic wages). Parents and children observe each other's total income but not each other's effort level. In the second-best optimum, unobservable shocks are only partially shared whereas, for any utility function satisfying a condition derived herein, observable shocks are fully shared. The model, therefore, can generate the low degree of risk sharing found in the recent studies, but Ricardian equivalence still holds.Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)no. w8851.Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic AgentsjelcFiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic AgentsH3jelcNishiyama Shinichi1363569Smetters Kent292064National Bureau of Economic Research.MaCbNBERMaCbNBERBOOK9910702926303321Ricardian Equivalence with Incomplete Household Risk Sharing3389960UNINA