02816nam 2200541Ia 450 991069432970332120071107131539.0(CKB)5470000002362759(OCoLC)180868204(EXLCZ)99547000000236275920071107d2007 ua 0engurbn|||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierStrategy, national interests, and means to an end[electronic resource] /Stephen D. SklenkaCarlisle, PA :Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,[2007]v, 26 pages digital, PDF fileCarlisle papers in security strategyTitle from title screen (viewed on Oct. 30, 2007)."October 2007."1-58487-309-4 Includes bibliographical references (pages 21-24).Introduction -- Ends, means, and the design of strategy -- Somalia on the periphery -- Strategic pitfalls of a Balkanizing policy -- Haiti and the American backyard -- Operation Iraqi Freedom and the ends-means disconnect -- Conclusion.The U.S. inability -- or unwillingness --to connect strategic ends and appropriate means to accomplish those ends has occurred so often over the past 15 years that one could make a credible argument that it has become a disturbing and pervasive characteristic of the modern American way of war. Beginning with a theoretical discussion of the relationship among ends, means, and strategy, this paper continues by examining specific cases of U.S. intervention from the previous decade and Operation Iraqi Freedom to demonstrate that when the U.S. commits its military forces, success can only be achieved if clear ends are identified, appropriate means are leveraged against those stated ends, and a coherent strategy is developed to coordinate the ends and means.StrategyEnds and meansNational interestUnited StatesIraq War, 2003-2011Operation Restore Hope, 1992-1993Operation Allied Force, 1999United StatesMilitary policyEvaluationHaitiHistoryAmerican intervention, 1994-1995Strategy.Ends and means.National interestIraq War, 2003-2011.Operation Restore Hope, 1992-1993.Operation Allied Force, 1999.Sklenka Stephen D1415872Army War College (U.S.).Strategic Studies Institute.GPOGPOBOOK9910694329703321Strategy, national interests, and means to an end3519231UNINA