02058oam 22003853a 450 991069350160332120230622022749.0(NBER)w9354(CKB)3240000000018764(EXLCZ)99324000000001876420230622d2002 fy 0engurcnu||||||||Educational Vouchers and Cream Skimming /Dennis Epple, Richard RomanoCambridge, MassNational Bureau of Economic Research20021 online resourceillustrations (black and white);NBER working paper seriesno. w9354November 2002.Epple and Romano (1998) show equilibrium provision of education by public and private schools has the latter skim off the wealthiest and most-able students, and flat-rate vouchers lead to further cream skimming. Here we study voucher design that would inject private-school competition and increase technical efficiencies without cream skimming. Conditioning vouchers on student ability without restriction on participating schools' policies fails to effect significantly cream skimming. However, by adding conditions like tuition constraints such as vouchers can reap the benefits of school competition without increased stratification. This can be accomplished while allowing voluntary participation in the voucher system and without tax increases.Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)no. w9354.Education and Research InstitutionsjelcPublicly Provided Private GoodsjelcEducation and Research InstitutionsPublicly Provided Private GoodsI2jelcH42jelcEpple Dennis128694Romano Richard1211118National Bureau of Economic Research.MaCbNBERMaCbNBERBOOK9910693501603321Educational Vouchers and Cream Skimming3389345UNINA