02508oam 2200601zu 450 991069343080332120241221110505.0(CKB)3360000000004331(SSID)ssj0000603768(PQKBManifestationID)12293664(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000603768(PQKBWorkID)10574491(PQKB)11264646(OCoLC)461002144(MiFhGG)4MSM(EXLCZ)99336000000000433120160829d2009 uy engurbn|||||||||txtccrEscalation and intrawar deterrence during limited wars in the Middle East[Place of publication not identified]Strategic Studies Institute U S Army War College20091 online resource (xiii, 112 pages)Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph9781584874065 1584874066 Includes bibliographical references (pages 95-112).This monograph analyzes military escalation and intrawar deterrence by examining two key wars where these concepts became especially relevant: the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. A central conclusion of this monograph is that intrawar deterrence is an inherently fragile concept, and that the nonuse of weapons of mass destruction in both wars was the result of a number of positive factors that may not be repeated in future conflicts.Escalation (Military science)1967-1973Case studiesDeterrence (Strategy)Case studiesArab-Israeli conflictPersian Gulf War, 1991Military & Naval ScienceHILCCLaw, Politics & GovernmentHILCCMilitary Science - GeneralHILCCMiddle EastStrategic aspectsEscalation (Military science)Deterrence (Strategy)Arab-Israeli conflict.Persian Gulf War, 1991.Military & Naval ScienceLaw, Politics & GovernmentMilitary Science - General956.04/8Terrill W. Andrew1070829Army War College (U.S.) Strategic Studies Institute,PQKBBOOK9910693430803321Escalation and intrawar deterrence during limited wars in the Middle East3204941UNINA