01822nam 2200637 a 450 991067117120332120221107224832.01-4492-0618-21-4175-0398-X(CKB)111087028324150(ItFiC)it 02479701(SSID)ssj0001021148(PQKBManifestationID)11944560(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001021148(PQKBWorkID)10993183(PQKB)10454288(MiAaPQ)EBC3158270(OCoLC)928584971(FlNmELB)ELB60824(EXLCZ)9911108702832415020201012e2003 || |spaurcn|||||||||txtccrEl derecho a la educación y la enseñanza[recurso electronico] /José Martínez de PisónMadrid Dykinson2003P. 1-158Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph84-9772-026-1 DerechoEducaciónDerecho a la educaciónEnseñanzaEducationSpainEducational law and legislationSpainRight to educationSpainEducacionDerecho.Educación.Derecho a la educación.Enseñanza.EducationEducational law and legislationRight to education340Martínez de Pisón José1333257e-libro, Corp.MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910671171203321El derecho a la educación y la enseñanza3042190UNINA04668oam 22011534 450 991016292560332120250426110502.09781475569926147556992097814755699401475569947(CKB)3710000001045048(MiAaPQ)EBC4800308(IMF)WPIEA2017005WPIEA2017005(EXLCZ)99371000000104504820020129d2017 uf 0engurcnu||||||||rdacontentrdamediardacarrierOn the Determinants of Fiscal Non-Compliance : An Empirical Analysis of Spain’s Regions /Mar Delgado-Téllez, Victor Lledo, Javier PérezWashington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2017.1 online resource (34 pages) illustrations, tablesIMF Working Papers9781475569841 147556984X Includes bibliographical references.This paper proposes an empirical framework that distinguishes voluntary from involuntary compliance with fiscal deficit targets on the basis of economic, institutional, and political factors. The framework is applied to Spain’s Autonomous Communities (regions) over the period 2002-2015. Fiscal noncompliance among Spain’s regions has shown to be persistent. It increases with the size of growth forecast errors and the extent to which fiscal targets are tightened, factors not fully under the control of regional governments. Non-compliance also tends to increase during election years, when vertical fiscal imbalances accentuate, and market financing costs subside. Strong fiscal rules have not shown any significant impact in containing fiscal non-compliance. Reducing fiscal non-compliance in multilevel governance systems such as the one in Spain requires a comprehensive assessment of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements that looks beyond rules-based frameworks by ensuring enforcement procedures are politically credible.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2017/005EconomicsEconomicsSpainBudgetingimfMacroeconomicsimfPublic FinanceimfNational BudgetimfBudget SystemsimfForecasts of Budgets, Deficits, and DebtimfState and Local Budget and ExpendituresimfIntergovernmental RelationsimfFederalismimfSecessionimfFiscal PolicyimfDebtimfDebt ManagementimfSovereign DebtimfPublic AdministrationimfPublic Sector Accounting and AuditsimfPublic finance & taxationimfBudgeting & financial managementimfGovernment debt managementimfFiscal rulesimfBudget planning and preparationimfFiscal consolidationimfFiscal risksimfPublic financial management (PFM)imfFiscal policyimfDebts, PublicimfBudgetimfSpainimfEconomics.EconomicsBudgetingMacroeconomicsPublic FinanceNational BudgetBudget SystemsForecasts of Budgets, Deficits, and DebtState and Local Budget and ExpendituresIntergovernmental RelationsFederalismSecessionFiscal PolicyDebtDebt ManagementSovereign DebtPublic AdministrationPublic Sector Accounting and AuditsPublic finance & taxationBudgeting & financial managementGovernment debt managementFiscal rulesBudget planning and preparationFiscal consolidationFiscal risksPublic financial management (PFM)Fiscal policyDebts, PublicBudget330Delgado-Téllez Mar1378740Lledo Victor495905Pérez Javier422393DcWaIMFBOOK9910162925603321On the Determinants of Fiscal Non-Compliance3650696UNINA