06002nam 2200481 450 991062431020332120230320211346.09783031096105(electronic bk.)9783031096099(MiAaPQ)EBC7134103(Au-PeEL)EBL7134103(CKB)25299360200041(OCoLC)1350690111(EXLCZ)992529936020004120230320d2022 uy 0engurcnu||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierThe meaning of something rethinking the logic and the unity of the ontology /Fosca Mariani Zini, editorCham, Switzerland :Springer,[2022]©20221 online resource (225 pages)Logic, argumentation & reasoning ;Volume 29Print version: Mariani Zini, Fosca The Meaning of Something Cham : Springer International Publishing AG,c2022 9783031096099 Includes bibliographical references and index.Intro -- Much Ado About Something -- Something and Material Ontology -- Inclusion/Exclusion -- Something as an ``A Priori´´ Mental Object -- Back to the Stoic -- Something and Formal Ontology -- Something-as-Something -- Something, Being, One -- The Chapters of This Book: Some Introductory Remarks -- Bibliography -- Contents -- Contributors -- Chapter 1: Brentano on Presenting Something as an Intentional Object -- 1.1 Brentano on Physical Phenomena -- 1.2 The Identity Thesis and Mental Monism -- 1.3 The Identity Thesis and Metaphysical Phenomenalism -- 1.4 Conceptual Dependence of Mental States´ Intentional Objects -- 1.5 The Theory of Primary and Secondary Objects and the Relationship Between Intentional Object and Presentation -- 1.6 Objections Against the Idea of Mediating Content -- 1.7 Concluding Remarks -- Bibliography -- Chapter 2: Husserl´s Transcendentals? On Object, Essence, Thing, Being and Substance -- 2.1 The Starting Point: The Objet/Something or Gegenstand Überhaupt -- 2.2 Essence -- 2.3 Formal Essence -- 2.4 Region -- 2.5 The Thing or Ding as the Individuum of the Region ``Physical Nature´´ -- 2.6 The Thing and the Phantom -- 2.7 Material Thing and Physicalistic Thing -- 2.8 The Material Thing as the Individuum of the Region ``Nature´´ -- 2.9 Substance and Being -- 2.10 Concluding Remarks -- Bibliography -- Chapter 3: Something But Not Too Much: Ontological Considerations in Intuitionistic Mathematics -- 3.1 Brouwer -- 3.2 Arend Heyting -- 3.3 A Final Comparison -- Bibliography -- Chapter 4: Russell on the Widest Words in the Philosophical Vocabulary: A Platonic Path Through Terms, Units and Entities -- 4.1 The Widest Word and Then Some -- 4.2 A Path Through the Properties of Terms -- 4.2.1 Refutations and Alternatives -- 4.2.2 A Reasoned Alternative -- 4.2.3 `Term´ Is the Widest Word -- 4.2.4 From `Terms´ to `Units´.4.2.5 From `Units´ to `Entities´ -- 4.2.6 Looking Back on the Path -- 4.3 A Platonic Path -- 4.3.1 Putting the Passage Back in the Frame -- 4.3.2 A Well-Trodden Road -- 4.3.3 τι, ν and ν in the Sophist, 237c7-e6 -- 4.3.4 Same Road, Different Destinations? -- 4.4 Concluding Remarks: An Analysis of Russell´s Platonism -- Bibliography -- Chapter 5: The Nature of Ordinary Objects -- 5.1 The Basic Principles of Ingarden´s Theory of Modes of Being -- 5.1.1 Existential Autonomous and Existential Heteronomous -- 5.1.2 Existential Originality and Existential Derivativeness -- 5.1.3 Existential Self-Sufficiency and Existential Non-Self-Sufficiency -- 5.1.4 Existential Dependence and Existential Independence -- 5.2 Ingarden´s Theory of Cultural Objects -- 5.2.1 Distinction Between Cultural Objects and Physical Objects on which they Depend -- 5.2.2 The Existence and Persistence of Cultural Objects Are Intentional -- 5.2.3 The Double Dependence of Cultural Objects -- 5.3 The Extension of the Domain of Intentionality -- 5.3.1 Distinction Between Ordinary Objects and the Physical Objects of Which They Are Constituted -- 5.3.2 The Existence and Persistence of Ordinary Objects Are Intentional -- 5.3.3 The Double Dependence of the Ordinary Objects -- 5.4 Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Chapter 6: Object and Something in General in Contemporary Formal Ontology -- 6.1 The Substantial View: The Manchester School -- 6.2 The Husserlian Heritage of the Substantial View -- 6.3 Formal Ontological Laws -- 6.4 How to Characterise Formal Ontological Structures? -- 6.5 Formal Objects and Relations: Jonathan Lowe -- 6.6 The Naïve View: Cocchiarella -- 6.7 Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Chapter 7: Flat Ontology, a Negative Cosmology? The Aliquid and Its Other -- 7.1 Liberate Things! The Fundamental Principles of Flat Ontology.7.1.1 A General Structure from Meinong´s Theory of Objects -- 7.1.2 The Triple Refusal of Flat Ontology -- 7.2 In Search of the Minimum Entity. The Aliquid as Brick of Flat Ontology -- 7.2.1 Thing, Object, Something -- 7.2.2 Determination of the Aliquid -- 7.3 Internal Difficulties and Ultimate Operations of Flat Ontologists -- 7.3.1 Conditions of Possibilities of the Aliquid´s Definition: The World as Essential Piece of Ontology -- 7.3.2 A Host of Difficulties -- 7.3.3 The Ultimate Operations of Flat Ontology -- 7.4 Concluding Remarks: Flat Ontology: A Proposal That Is Neither Liberal, Nor Ontological, Nor Realist -- Bibliography -- Chapter 8: Nothing, Everything, Something! -- 8.1 A Trialogue -- 8.2 Comments -- Bibliography -- Name Index -- Subject Index.Logic, argumentation & reasoning ;Volume 29.Meaning (Philosophy)OntologyMeaning (Philosophy)Ontology.121.68Mariani-Zini FoscaMiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQ9910624310203321The meaning of something3075368UNINA