02466nam 2200373 450 991057686770332120230511043509.0(CKB)5860000000051470(NjHacI)995860000000051470(EXLCZ)99586000000005147020230511d2022 uy 0engur|||||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierThe Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box Electoral Manipulation, Economic Maneuvering, and Political Order in Autocracies /Masaaki HigashijimaAnn Arbor, Michigan :University of Michigan Press,2022.1 online resource (xxiii, 345 pages) illustrationsWeiser Center for Emerging Democracies series0-472-22008-X Modern dictatorships hold elections. Contrary to our stereotypical views of autocratic politics, dictators often introduce elections with limited manipulation wherein they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud and pro-regime electoral institutions. Why do such electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box explores how dictators design elections and what consequences those elections have on political order. It argues that strong autocrats who can effectively garner popular support through extensive economic distribution become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition's stunning election victories. The book's theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics--Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The book's findings suggest that indicators of free and fair elections in dictatorships may not be enough to achieve full-fledged democratization.Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies series.Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box DictatorshipDictatorship.321.9 Higashijima Masaaki1254236NjHacINjHaclBOOK9910576867703321The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box2908242UNINA