03882nam 22005775 450 991050299860332120251113194756.03-030-70653-210.1007/978-3-030-70653-1(CKB)5170000000033811(MiAaPQ)EBC6747807(Au-PeEL)EBL6747807(OCoLC)1281955743(DE-He213)978-3-030-70653-1(EXLCZ)99517000000003381120211008d2021 u| 0engurcnu||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierOverlooking Conventions The Trouble With Linguistic Pragmatism /by Michael Devitt1st ed. 2021.Cham :Springer International Publishing :Imprint: Springer,2021.1 online resource (329 pages)Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology,2214-3815 ;293-030-70652-4 Preface -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Reliance on Intuitions -- Chapter 3. The Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction -- Chapter 4: Speaker Meanings and Intentions -- Chapter 5. Linguistic Conventions and Language -- Chapter 6. Bach and Neale on “What is Said” -- Chapter 7. Confusion of the Metaphysics Of Meaning With the Epistemology of Interpretation -- Chapter 8. Modified Occam’s Razor and The Denial of Linguistic Meanings -- Chapter 9. Referential Descriptions: A Case Study -- Chapter 10. Saturation and Pragmatism’s Challenge -- Chapter 11. Polysemy and Pragmatism’s Challenge -- Chapter 12. Sub-Sententials: Pragmatics or Semantics? -- Index.This book criticizes the methodology of the recent semantics-pragmatics debate in the theory of language and proposes an alternative. It applies this methodology to argue for a traditional view against a group of “contextualists” and “pragmatists”, including Sperber and Wilson, Bach, Carston, Recanati, Neale, and many others. The author disagrees with these theorists who hold that the meaning of the sentence in an utterance never, or hardly ever, yields its literal truth-conditional content, even after disambiguation and reference fixing; it needs to be pragmatically supplemented in context. The standard methodology of this debate is to consult intuitions. The book argues that theories should be tested against linguistic usage. Theoretical distinctions, however intuitive, need to be scientifically motivated. Also we should not be guided by Grice’s “Modified Occam’s Razor”, Ruhl’s “Monosemantic Bias”, or other such strategies for “meaning denialism”. From this novel perspective, the striking examples of context relativity that motivate contextualists and pragmatists typically exemplify semantic rather than pragmatic properties. In particular, polysemous phenomena should typically be treated as semantic ambiguity. The author argues that conventions have been overlooked, that there’s no extensive “semantic underdetermination” and that the new theoretical framework of “truth-conditional pragmatics” is a mistake.Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology,2214-3815 ;29Language and languagesPhilosophyPragmaticsLinguisticsPhilosophy of LanguagePragmaticsLinguisticsLanguage and languagesPhilosophy.Pragmatics.Linguistics.Philosophy of Language.Pragmatics.Linguistics.306.44Devitt Michael1938-496787MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910502998603321Overlooking Conventions2567977UNINA