07021nam 22009013u 450 991050058650332120251017110112.094-024-2086-X(CKB)5590000000557743EBL6722062(OCoLC)1268472090(AU-PeEL)EBL6722062(oapen)https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/72042(MiAaPQ)EBC6722062(PPN)258053151(oapen)doab72042(DNLM)9918486468106676(Au-PeEL)EBL6722062(EXLCZ)99559000000055774320220617d2021|||| u|| |engur|n|---|||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierEmerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology Addressing Security and Resilience Issues1st ed.Dordrecht Springer Netherlands20211 online resource (233 p.)NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security Description based upon print version of record.94-024-2085-1 Intro -- Disclaimer -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- About the Editors -- Chapter 1: Biosecurity for Synthetic Biology and Emerging Biotechnologies: Critical Challenges for Governance -- 1.1 An Introduction to the Dual-Use Nature of Emerging Biotechnology -- 1.2 History -- 1.3 Effective Governance and Policy for Biosecurity -- 1.4 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 2: Emerging Biosecurity Threats and Responses: A Review of Published and Gray Literature -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Methods -- 2.3 Results and Discussion -- 2.3.1 US and EU Governmental Frameworks -- 2.3.1.1 US Framework2.3.1.2 EU Framework -- 2.3.2 Threats Identified in the Literature -- 2.3.3 Responses Identified in the Literature -- 2.4 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 3: Opportunities, Challenges, and Future Considerations for Top-Down Governance for Biosecurity and Synthetic Biology -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Understanding the Scope and Limitations of Top-Down Governance for Biosecurity and Synthetic Biology -- 3.2.1 International Instruments for Biosecurity -- 3.2.1.1 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) -- 3.2.1.2 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)3.2.1.3 Australia Group, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and Others -- 3.2.2 National Implementation -- 3.2.2.1 Hard Law vs. Soft Law -- 3.2.2.2 Biosafety vs. Biosecurity, GMOs vs. Synthetic Biology -- 3.2.2.3 National Implementation: An Inevitable Patchwork -- 3.3 Key Novelties and Tensions Introduced by Synthetic Biology -- 3.3.1 Convergence -- 3.3.2 Democratization -- 3.3.3 Intangibility -- 3.4 Conclusions and Recommendations -- References -- Chapter 4: Biological Standards and Biosecurity: The Unexplored Link -- 4.1 Standards in Biology4.2 Implications of Standards in Biosecurity in Terms of Risks -- 4.3 Universality -- 4.4 Chassis and Trojan Horses -- 4.5 Breaking Down the Species Barrier -- 4.6 Standards as Social Constructs -- 4.7 Final Remarks and Open Questions -- References -- Chapter 5: Responsible Governance of Biosecurity in Armenia -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Capacity Building in Dual Use Export Control in TI Partner Countries -- 5.3 Legal Framework Governing Dual Use Life Sciences and Biosecurity5.3.1 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare - Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 -- 5.3.2 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction -- 5.3.3 United Nation Security Council Resolution No. 1540 (UNSCR 1540) -- 5.3.4 National Laws and Law Enforcement -- 5.4 Ethics of Dual Use Life Sciences -- 5.5 Case Study Life Sciences and Biosecurity in Armenia -- 5.6 Dual Use Life Sciences in Armenia5.7 Discussing Ethical DilemmasSynthetic biology is a field of biotechnology that is rapidly growing in various applications, such as in medicine, environmental sustainability, and energy production. However these technologies also have unforeseen risks and applications to humans and the environment. This open access book presents discussions on risks and mitigation strategies for these technologies including biosecurity, or the potential of synthetic biology technologies and processes to be deliberately misused for nefarious purposes. The book presents strategies to prevent, mitigate, and recover from ‘dual-use concern’ biosecurity challenges that may be raised by individuals, rogue states, or non-state actors. Several key topics are explored including opportunities to develop more coherent and scalable approaches to govern biosecurity from a laboratory perspective up to the international scale and strategies to prevent potential health and environmental hazards posed by deliberate misuse of synthetic biology without stifling innovation. The book brings together the expertise of top scholars in synthetic biology and biotechnology risk assessment, management, and communication to discuss potential biosecurity governing strategies and offer perspectives for collaboration in oversight and future regulatory guidance.NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security BiotecnologiathubEnginyeria biomèdicathubBiomedical engineeringbicsscEnvironmental science, engineering & technologybicsscInternational relationsbicsscCrime & criminologybicsscBiotechnologybicsscEnvironment lawbicsscLlibres electrònicsthubSynthetic Biology GovernanceBiotechnology RegulationEnvironmental SustainabilityEnergy ProductionRisks and ApplicationsRisk AssessmentHuman Health RisksEnvironmental Health RisksOpen AccessBiotecnologiaEnginyeria biomèdicaBiomedical engineeringEnvironmental science, engineering & technologyInternational relationsCrime & criminologyBiotechnologyEnvironment law358.38Trump Benjamin D1074437Florin Marie-Valentine1235624Perkins Edward1235625Linkov Igor942553AU-PeELAU-PeELAU-PeELBOOK9910500586503321Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology2869710UNINA