04561nam 22007455 450 991048325320332120200920121131.03-319-13114-110.1007/978-3-319-13114-6(MiAaPQ)EBC1966864(DE-He213)978-3-319-13114-6(PPN)183092341(EXLCZ)99371000000029156220141121d2015 u| 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrContracts of Adhesion Between Law and Economics[electronic resource] Rethinking the Unconscionability Doctrine /by Elena D'Agostino1st ed. 2015.Cham :Springer International Publishing :Imprint: Springer,2015.1 online resource (84 p.)SpringerBriefs in Law,2192-855XDescription based upon print version of record.3-319-13113-3 Includes bibliographical references.1. The Unconscionability Doctrine in a Law & Economics Perspective -- 2. Market structure -- 3. Lack of sophistication -- 4. Voluntary Disclosure of Clauses -- 5. Public Intervention -- 6. Concluding remarks.This book examines the most controversial issues concerning the use of pre-drafted clauses in fine print, which are usually included in consumer contracts and presented to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. By applying a multi-disciplinary approach that combines consumer’s psychology and seller’s drafting power in the logic of efficiency and good faith, the book provides a fresh and unconventional analysis of the existing literature, both theoretical and empirical. Moving from the unconscionability doctrine, it criticizes (and in some cases refutes) its main conclusions based on criteria which are usually invoked to sustain the need for public intervention to protect consumers, and specifically related to Law (contract complexity), Psychology (consumer lack of sophistication criterion) and Economics (market structure criterion). It also analyzes the effects of different regulations, such as banning vexatious clauses or mandating disclosure clauses, showing that none of them protect consumers, but in fact prove to be harmful when consumers are more vulnerable, that is whenever sellers can exploit some degree of market power. In closing, the book combines these disparate aspects, arguing that the solution (if any) to the problem of consumer exploitation and market inefficiency associated with the use of contracts of adhesion in these contexts cannot be found in removing or prohibiting hidden clauses, but instead has to take into account the effects of these clauses on the contract as a whole.SpringerBriefs in Law,2192-855XLaw—PhilosophyLawLaw and economicsInternational lawTradeLaw—EuropePrivate international lawConflict of lawsTheories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal Historyhttps://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/R11011Law and Economicshttps://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/W39000International Economic Law, Trade Lawhttps://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/R19050European Lawhttps://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/R20000Private International Law, International & Foreign Law, Comparative Law https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/R14002Law—Philosophy.Law.Law and economics.International law.Trade.Law—Europe.Private international law.Conflict of laws.Theories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History.Law and Economics.International Economic Law, Trade Law.European Law.Private International Law, International & Foreign Law, Comparative Law .346.402D'Agostino Elenaauthttp://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut1228459MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910483253203321Contracts of Adhesion Between Law and Economics2851890UNINA