04897nam 2200577 450 991046779420332120200520144314.03-11-047069-13-11-047297-X10.1515/9783110472974(CKB)4340000000203600(MiAaPQ)EBC5049489(DE-B1597)463337(OCoLC)1004866946(DE-B1597)9783110472974(Au-PeEL)EBL5049489(CaPaEBR)ebr11443137(CaONFJC)MIL1036812(OCoLC)1004621532(EXLCZ)99434000000020360020171017h20172017 uy 0engurcnu||||||||rdacontentrdamediardacarrierSocial dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation /Ben Jann, Wojtek Przepiorka (Eds.)Berlin, [Germany] ;Boston, [Massachusetts] :De Gruyter Oldenbourg,2017.©20171 online resource (584 pages)3-11-047195-7 Includes bibliographical references.Frontmatter -- Preface -- Contents -- Introduction -- Micro-Macro Models in Sociology: Antecedents of Coleman’s Diagram -- The Kula Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski: Simulating the Co-Evolution of an Economic and Ceremonial Exchange System -- From the Savannah to the Magistrate’s Court -- The Dependence of Human Cognitive and Motivational Processes on Institutional Systems -- Social Dilemmas and Solutions in Immunizations -- When Do People Follow Norms and When Do They Pursue Their Interests? -- Personal Exposure to Unfavorable Environmental Conditions: Does it Stimulate Environmental Activism? -- Cooperation and Career Chances in Science -- Social Dilemmas in Science: Detecting Misconduct and Finding Institutional Solutions -- The Interplay of Social Status and Reciprocity -- Types of Normative Conflicts and the Effectiveness of Punishment -- Social Status and Peer-Punishment: Findings from Two Road Traffic Field Experiments -- The Double Edge of Counter-Sanctions. Is Peer Sanctioning Robust to Counter-Punishment but Vulnerable to Counter-Reward? -- Diffusion of Responsibility in Norm Enforcement -- Endogenous Peer Punishment Institutions in Prisoner’s Dilemmas: The Role of Noise -- Cooperation and Distrust – a Contradiction? -- Signaling Theory Evolving: Signals and Signs of Trustworthiness in Social Exchange -- Trust and Promises as Friendly Advances -- Online Reputation in eBay Auctions: Damaging and Rebuilding Trustworthiness Through Feedback Comments from Buyers and Sellers -- Nash Dynamics, Meritocratic Matching, and Cooperation -- A Note on the Strategic Determination of the Required Number of Volunteers -- Is No News Bad News? A Hostage Trust Game with Incomplete Information and Fairness Considerations of the Trustee -- When Prediction Fails -- Measuring Social Preferences on Amazon Mechanical Turk -- Repetition Effects in Laboratory Experiments -- Notes on the Editors and Contributors The question of how cooperation and social order can evolve from a Hobbesian state of nature of a “war of all against all” has always been at the core of social scientific inquiry. Social dilemmas are the main analytical paradigm used by social scientists to explain competition, cooperation, and conflict in human groups. The formal analysis of social dilemmas allows for identifying the conditions under which cooperation evolves or unravels. This knowledge informs the design of institutions that promote cooperative behavior. Yet to gain practical relevance in policymaking and institutional design, predictions derived from the analysis of social dilemmas must be put to an empirical test. The collection of articles in this book gives an overview of state-of-the-art research on social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation. It covers theoretical contributions and offers a broad range of examples on how theoretical insights can be empirically verified and applied to cooperation problems in everyday life. By bringing together a group of distinguished scholars, the book fills an important gap in sociological scholarship and addresses some of the most interesting questions of human sociality. Rational choice theorySocial choiceSocial normsElectronic books.Rational choice theory.Social choice.Social norms.302/.13Przepiorka WojtekJann BenMiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910467794203321Social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation2476462UNINA