01818nam 2200565Ia 450 991046458600332120170918214427.01-4623-6291-51-4527-8242-31-282-64909-497866138229011-4519-0969-1(CKB)3360000000443323(EBL)3014343(SSID)ssj0000941195(PQKBManifestationID)11525486(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000941195(PQKBWorkID)10963488(PQKB)10054208(OCoLC)698585545(MiAaPQ)EBC3014343(EXLCZ)99336000000044332320061003d2006 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrGoal-independent central banks[electronic resource] why politicians decide to delegate /prepared by Christopher Crowe[Washington, D.C.] International Monetary Fund20061 online resource (43 p.)IMF working paper ;WP/06/256"November 2006."1-4518-6516-3 Includes bibliographical references.""Contents""; ""I. Introduction""; ""II. The Model""; ""III. Predictions""; ""IV. Empirical Tests""; ""V. Case Studies""; ""VI. Conclusions""IMF working paper ;WP/06/256.Banks and banking, CentralMonetary policyElectronic books.Banks and banking, Central.Monetary policy.Crowe Christopher868737MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910464586003321Goal-independent central banks2041137UNINA