02208nam 2200613Ia 450 991046435910332120170821180633.01-4623-1248-91-4527-8647-X1-283-51558-X1-4519-0860-19786613828033(CKB)3360000000443731(EBL)3014528(SSID)ssj0000943068(PQKBManifestationID)11558966(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943068(PQKBWorkID)10975060(PQKB)11574660(OCoLC)694141232(MiAaPQ)EBC3014528(EXLCZ)99336000000044373120061002d2006 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrSovereign insurance and program design[electronic resource] what is optimal for the sovereign? /prepared by Miguel Messmacher[Washington, D.C.] International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute20061 online resource (30 p.)IMF working paper ;WP/06/64"March 2006."1-4518-6324-1 Includes bibliographical references.""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. MORAL HAZARD AND SOVEREIGN INSURANCE""; ""III. BASIC MODEL STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE OF INSURANCE""; ""IV. AN ALTRUISTIC INSURER""; ""V. DEFAULT BY THE COUNTRY""; ""VI. CONCLUSIONS""; ""VII. DERIVATION OF THE RESULTS""; ""REFERENCES""IMF working paper ;WP/06/64.InsuranceEconometric modelsMoral hazardEconometric modelsInternational financeEconometric modelsElectronic books.InsuranceEconometric models.Moral hazardEconometric models.International financeEconometric models.Messmacher Miguel867566International Monetary Fund.IMF Institute.MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910464359103321Sovereign insurance and program design1936370UNINA