03708nam 2200673 450 991046401020332120170817212540.01-4623-0535-01-4527-9953-91-4518-6967-397866128406161-282-84061-4(CKB)3170000000055015(EBL)1607851(SSID)ssj0000944006(PQKBManifestationID)11501262(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000944006(PQKBWorkID)10982725(PQKB)11579526(OCoLC)815741252(MiAaPQ)EBC1607851(EXLCZ)99317000000005501520140225h20082008 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrCredit booms and lending standards evidence from the subprime mortgage market /Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Deniz Igan, and Luc Laeven[Washington, District of Columbia] :International Monetary Fund,2008.©20081 online resource (39 p.)IMF Working PapersIMF working paper ;WP/08/106Description based upon print version of record.1-4519-1421-0 Includes bibliographical references.Contents; I. Introduction; II. Related Literature; III. Data and Descriptive Statistics; IV. Empirical Methodology; V. Empirical Findings; A. Effects of Changes in the Pool of Applicant Borrowers; B. Identification and Robustness Issues; C. Sensitivity Analysis: Time and Size Effects; D. Effects of Entry and Changes in Market Structure; E. Alternative Proxies for Lending Standards; F. Effects of Loan Sales; VI. Discussion and Conclusions; References; Tables; 1. Coverage in HMDA; 2. Definitions and Sources of Variables; 3. Summary Statistics; 4. Evolution of Denial Rates5. Determinants of Denial Decision6. Prediction Errors; 7. Robustness; 8. Time and Size Effects; 9. Market and Boom Size; 10. Market Entry and Denial Rates of Incumbents in Prime and Subprime Markets; 11. Alternative Measures of Lending Standards; 12. Securitization, Lending Standards, and Mortgage Market Expansion; Figures; 1. House Prices and Credit Booms; 2. Subprime Mortgage Boom Across the Nation; 3. House Prices and Credit Boom; 4. Lending Standards and Subprime Credit BoomThis paper links the current sub-prime mortgage crisis to a decline in lending standards associated with the rapid expansion of this market. We show that lending standards declined more in areas that experienced larger credit booms and house price increases. We also find that the underlying market structure mattered, with entry of new, large lenders triggering declines in lending standards by incumbent banks. Finally, lending standards declined more in areas with higher mortgage securitization rates. The results are consistent with theoretical predictions from recent financial accelerator modeIMF Working PapersCreditUnited StatesCreditUnited StatesEconometric modelsMoral hazardUnited StatesEconometric modelsElectronic books.CreditCreditEconometric models.Moral hazardEconometric models.332.70973Dell'Ariccia Giovanni283573Igan Deniz873077Laeven Luc887526MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910464010203321Credit booms and lending standards2273590UNINA