03708nam 2200637 a 450 991046360260332120170817212554.01-4623-3763-51-4527-6522-71-4518-7005-197866128409821-282-84098-3(CKB)3170000000055046(EBL)1607900(SSID)ssj0000940815(PQKBManifestationID)11598327(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940815(PQKBWorkID)10975346(PQKB)10001135(OCoLC)568151213(MiAaPQ)EBC1607900(EXLCZ)99317000000005504620090807d2008 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrFinancial supervisory independence and accountability[electronic resource] exploring the determinants /prepared by Donato Masciandaro, Marc Quintyn, and Michael TaylorWashington, D.C. International Monetary Fund IMF Institute20081 online resource (36 p.)IMF working paper ;WP/08/147"June 2008."1-4519-1458-X Includes bibliographical references (p. 31-34).Contents; I. Introduction; II. Background; III. Analysis of Independence and Accountability Indices; A. Sample and Methodology; B. Main Findings; Tables; 1. Ratings on Supervisory Independence and Accountability, and on Independence in Monetary Policy; Figures; 1. Scatter Plot of Independence and Accountabilty Ratings; C. A Look into the Individual Criteria; 2. Spread Between Independence and Accountability Ratings; D. Location Has an Impact; 2. Governance Ratings by Location of Supervisor and Standard Deviation of Ratings in Italics; IV. The determinants of supervisory governanceA. The Econometric ApproachB. Model to be Tested; C. The Results; 3. Ordered Logit Estimates with Total Governance as the Dependent Variable; 4. Ordered Logit Estimates with Independence as the Dependent Variable; 5. Ordered Logit Estimates with Accountability as the Dependent Variable; V. Conclusions; Appendixes; I. Countries Selected for the Survey; II. Ratings by Criteria Across the Sample; III. Definition and Sources of Variables; IV. Correlation Matrix of Variables; ReferencesWe analyze recent trends in, and determinants of, financial supervisory governance. We first calculate levels of supervisory independence and accountability in 55 countries. The econometric analysis of the determinants indicates that the quality of public sector governance plays a decisive role in establishing accountability arrangements, more than independence arrangements. It also shows that decisions regarding levels of independence and accountability are not well-connected. The results also show that the likelihood of establishing adequate governance arrangements are higher when the supervIMF working paper ;WP/08/147.FinanceState supervisionBanks and banking, CentralState supervisionElectronic books.FinanceState supervision.Banks and banking, CentralState supervision.Masciandaro Donato1961-89517Quintyn Marc247373Taylor Michael1962-325091IMF Institute.International Monetary Fund.MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910463602603321Financial supervisory independence and accountability2015879UNINA