04155nam 2200673 450 991046360190332120170817212540.01-4623-1443-01-4527-4000-31-282-84092-41-4518-6999-19786612840920(CKB)3170000000055044(EBL)1607898(SSID)ssj0000944137(PQKBManifestationID)11503325(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000944137(PQKBWorkID)10983369(PQKB)10193867(OCoLC)252901774(MiAaPQ)EBC1607898(EXLCZ)99317000000005504420140225h20082008 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrHerd behavior in financial markets an experiment with financial market professionals /Marco Cipriani and Antonio Guarino[Washington, District of Columbia] :International Monetary Fund,2008.©20081 online resource (30 p.)IMF Working PapersIMF working paper ;WP/08/141Description based upon print version of record.1-4519-1452-0 Includes bibliographical references.Contents; I. Introduction; A. Literature Review; II. The Theoreticalmodel; A. The model structure; B. Theoretical predictions; Figures; 1. Prices and Traders' Expectations after a History of Buys; III. The Experiment and the Experimental Design; A. The experiment; B. Experimental design: the two treatments; 2. Prices and Traders' Expectations after a History of Sells; 3. Prices and Traders' Expectations after a Sell Followed by a History of Buys; IV. Results: Rationality, Herding and Contrarian Behavior; A. Treatment I; Tables; 1. Average behavior in Treatment I2. Cascade trading behavior in Treatment IB. Treatment II; 3. No trade in Treatment I; 4. Average behavior in Treatment II; V. Comparison with Previous Experimental Results; 5. Cascade trading behavior in Treatment II; 6. No trade in Treatment II; VI. Individual Behavior; 7. Percentage of decisions in accordance with the theoretical prediction at individual level.; VII. Conclusions; 8. Regressions of the level of rationality in the experiment on individual characteristics. P-values in parenthesis9. Regression of subjects' payoff at the end of the experiment on individual characteristics. P-values in parenthesis10. Regressions of participants' proportion of herding, contrarianism and no trading on the trader's dummy. Herd 1 and Contrarian 1 refer to Treatment I. Herd 2 and Contrarian 2 refer to Treatment II. P-values in parenthesis; ReferencesWe study herd behavior in a laboratory financial market with financial market professionals. We compare two treatments, one in which the price adjusts to the order flow so that herding should never occur, and one in which event uncertainty makes herding possible. In the first treatment, subjects herd seldom, in accordance with both the theory and previous experimental evidence on student subjects. A proportion of subjects, however, engage in contrarianism, something not accounted for by the theory. In the second treatment, the proportion of herding decisions increases, but not as much as theorIMF Working PapersCapitalists and financiersPsychologyEconometric modelsInvestmentsDecision makingEconometric modelsCollective behaviorEconometric modelsElectronic books.Capitalists and financiersPsychologyEconometric models.InvestmentsDecision makingEconometric models.Collective behaviorEconometric models.330.12Cipriani Marco869956Guarino Antonio305062MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910463601903321Herd behavior in financial markets1942255UNINA