03788nam 2200613Ia 450 991046224810332120200520144314.01-4755-8778-31-4755-3005-6(CKB)2670000000278846(EBL)1606934(SSID)ssj0000943834(PQKBManifestationID)11503123(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943834(PQKBWorkID)10978435(PQKB)11265843(MiAaPQ)EBC1606934(Au-PeEL)EBL1606934(CaPaEBR)ebr10627067(OCoLC)805951598(EXLCZ)99267000000027884620111102d2012 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrChicago plan revisited[electronic resource] /prepared by Jaromir Benes and Michael KumhofWashington, DC International Monetary Fund20121 online resource (72 p.)IMF working paper ;12/202Description based upon print version of record.1-4755-6220-9 1-4755-0552-3 Includes bibliographical references.Cover; Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Chicago Plan in the History of Monetary Thought; A. Government versus Private Control over Money Issuance; B. The Chicago Plan; III. The Model under the Current Monetary System; A. Banks; B. Lending Technologies; C. Transactions Cost Technologies; D. Equity Ownership and Dividends; E. Unconstrained Households; F. Constrained Households; G. Unions; H. Manufacturers; I. Capital Goods Producers; J. Capital Investment Funds; K. Government; 1. Monetary Policy; 2. Prudential Policy; 3. Fiscal Policy; 4. Government Budget Constraint; L. Market ClearingIV. The Model under the Chicago PlanA. Banks; B. Households; C. Manufacturers; D. Government; 1. Monetary Policy; 2. Prudential Policy; 3. Fiscal Policy; 4. Government Budget Constraint; 5. Controlling Boom-Bust Cycles - Additional Considerations; V. Calibration; VI. Transition to the Chicago Plan; VII. Credit Booms and Busts Pre-Transition and Post-Transition; VIII. Conclusion; References; Figures; 1. Changes in Bank Balance Sheet in Transition Period (percent of GDP); 2. Changes in Government Balance Sheet in Transition Period (percent of GDP)3. Changes in Bank Balance Sheet - Details (percent of GDP)4. Transition to Chicago Plan - Bank Balance Sheets; 5. Transition to Chicago Plan - Main Macroeconomic Variables; 6. Transition to Chicago Plan - Fiscal Variables; 7. Business Cycle Properties Pre-Transition versus Post-TransitionAt the height of the Great Depression a number of leading U.S. economists advanced a proposal for monetary reform that became known as the Chicago Plan. It envisaged the separation of the monetary and credit functions of the banking system, by requiring 100% reserve backing for deposits. Irving Fisher (1936) claimed the following advantages for this plan: (1) Much better control of a major source of business cycle fluctuations, sudden increases and contractions of bank credit and of the supply of bank-created money. (2) Complete elimination of bank runs. (3) Dramatic reduction of the (net) pubIMF Working PapersBanking lawUnited StatesBanks and bankingUnited StatesElectronic books.Banking lawBanks and bankingBenes Jaromir866239Kumhof Michael866240MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910462248103321Chicago plan revisited1933299UNINA