03255nam 2200601Ia 450 991046198170332120200520144314.01-4755-2021-21-4755-3924-X(CKB)2670000000278823(EBL)1606936(SSID)ssj0000949374(PQKBManifestationID)11521999(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000949374(PQKBWorkID)10996015(PQKB)10526840(MiAaPQ)EBC1606936(Au-PeEL)EBL1606936(CaPaEBR)ebr10627044(OCoLC)805985260(EXLCZ)99267000000027882320111102d2012 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrDonor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation [electronic resource] /oprepared by Kurt Annen and Luc MoersWashington, DC International Monetary Fund20121 online resource (38 p.)IMF working paper ;12/204Description based upon print version of record.1-4755-5957-7 1-4755-0554-X Includes bibliographical references.Cover; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Donor Coordination in Practice: Fragmentation; Figures; 1 Number of Recipient Countries and Global Aid Budget Shares; 2 Global Aid Herfindahl Index; 3 Background Literature; 4 Model; 4.1 Donors Maximize Net Aid Impact; 4.2 Donors Maximize Relative Net Aid Impact; 3 Best-Response Functions with Identical Donors; 4.3 Introducing Fixed Costs; 4 Best-Response Functions with Non-Identical Donors; 4.4 Introducing More Recipients and More Donors; 5 Empirical Evidence; Tables; 1 Larger Donors vs. Smaller Donors; 5 Herfindahl Index and Relative Donor Size2 Donor Ranking in Aid Selectivity3 Donor Selectivity and Herfindahl Index; 6 Conclusion; References; Appendix A; Proof of Proposition 1; Description of Best-Response Functions; Proof of Proposition 4; Appendix B; Table 4: Donor Selectivity and MLD; Table 5: Donor Selectivity and Theil IndexThis paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors' budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors' maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aidIMF Working PapersEconomic assistanceFlow of fundsElectronic books.Economic assistance.Flow of funds.Annen Kurt1967-956889Moers Luc956890MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910461981703321Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation2167251UNINA