00619nam0-22002411i-450-990001195230403321000119523FED01000119523(Aleph)000119523FED0100011952320000920d????----km-y0itay50------baengAlgebra praticadi Ciamberlini C.s.l.Paravias.d.Ciamberlini,Corrado54472ITUNINARICAUNIMARCBK990001195230403321205-H-5104237MA1MA1Algebra pratica341758UNINAING0103323nam 2200601Ia 450 991046197500332120200520144314.01-4755-1248-11-4755-1246-5(CKB)2670000000278930(EBL)1607012(SSID)ssj0000941793(PQKBManifestationID)11498813(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000941793(PQKBWorkID)10971664(PQKB)11650760(MiAaPQ)EBC1607012(Au-PeEL)EBL1607012(CaPaEBR)ebr10627151(OCoLC)812041171(EXLCZ)99267000000027893020121206d2012 uy 0engurcn|||||||||txtccrBanking and trading[electronic resource] /Arnoud W. A. Boot and Lev RatnovskiWashington, D.C. International Monetary Fundc20121 online resource (49 p.)IMF working paper ;WP/12/238Description based upon print version of record.1-4755-1247-3 1-4755-1121-3 Includes bibliographical references.Cover; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Relationship to the Literature; III. Model; A. Approach; B. Credit Constraints; C. Banking; D. Trading; IV. Benefits of Conglomeration; V. Time Inconsistency of Capital Allocation; A. Setup: Long-term Banking; B. The Consequences of Time Inconsistency; C. Cost of Conglomeration under Time Inconsistency; VI. Trading as Risk-Shifting; A. Setup: Risky Trading; B. Risk-Shifting; C. The Interaction of Time Inconsistency and Risk Shifting; VII. Discussion; A. Front-loaded Income in Relationship Banking; B. External Equity and Internal Capital AllocationC. Policy Implications VIII. Conclusion; References; Figures; 1. The Timeline; 2. The Timeline with Time Inconsistency; 3. Relationship Banking Allocation R as a Function of Trading Opportunities; 4. The Volume of Banking (R) and Trading (T), and Profits (Π)under Conglomerated Banking; 5. The Volumes of Banking (R)and Trading (T), and Profits (Π) with Risk-shifting; 6. Time Inconsistency Arises due to a Higher Return to Trading under Risk-shifting ("Effect 1"); 7. Risk-shifting Arises due to a Higher Volume of Trading, Driven by Time Inconsistency ("Effect 2")We study the effects of a bank's engagement in trading. Traditional banking is relationship-based: not scalable, long-term oriented, with high implicit capital, and low risk (thanks to the law of large numbers). Trading is transactions-based: scalable, shortterm, capital constrained, and with the ability to generate risk from concentrated positions. When a bank engages in trading, it can use its ?spare' capital to profitablity expand the scIMF Working PapersBanks and bankingStocksElectronic books.Banks and banking.Stocks.Boot Arnoud W. A(Willem Alexander),1960-122541Ratnovski Lev895958MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910461975003321Banking and trading2001617UNINA