04383nam 2200745 450 991046114970332120200520144314.01-5017-0175-41-5017-0176-210.7591/9781501701764(CKB)3710000000462302(EBL)3425998(SSID)ssj0001544197(PQKBManifestationID)16135039(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001544197(PQKBWorkID)13865741(PQKB)10034043(MiAaPQ)EBC3425998(OCoLC)1080551455(MdBmJHUP)muse58379(DE-B1597)496619(OCoLC)918561556(DE-B1597)9781501701764(Au-PeEL)EBL3425998(CaPaEBR)ebr11090351(CaONFJC)MIL822042(EXLCZ)99371000000046230220150223h20152015 uy| 0engur|||||||||||txtccrThe dictator's army battlefield effectiveness in authoritarian regimes /Caitlin TalmadgeIthaca ;London :Cornell University Press,2015.©20151 online resource (xi, 304 pages) illustrationsCornell studies in security affairsDescription based upon print version of record.1-5017-0029-4 0-8014-5347-X Includes bibliographical references and index.Introduction: the puzzle of battlefield effectiveness -- A framework for explaining battlefield effectiveness -- Threats and military organizational practices in North and South Vietnam -- Battlefield effectiveness in North and South Vietnam -- Threats and military organizational practices in Iraq and Iran -- Battlefield effectiveness in Iraq and Iran -- Conclusion: threats, military organizational practices, and the battlefields of the future.In The Dictator's Army, Caitlin Talmadge presents a compelling new argument to help us understand why authoritarian militaries sometimes fight very well-and sometimes very poorly. Talmadge's framework for understanding battlefield effectiveness focuses on four key sets of military organizational practices: promotion patterns, training regimens, command arrangements, and information management. Different regimes face different domestic and international threat environments, leading their militaries to adopt different policies in these key areas of organizational behavior.Authoritarian regimes facing significant coup threats are likely to adopt practices that squander the state's military power, while regimes lacking such threats and possessing ambitious foreign policy goals are likely to adopt the effective practices often associated with democracies. Talmadge shows the importance of threat conditions and military organizational practices for battlefield performance in two paired comparisons of states at war: North and South Vietnam (1963-1975) and Iran and Iraq (1980-1988). Drawing on extensive documentary sources, her analysis demonstrates that threats and practices can vary not only between authoritarian regimes but also within them, either over time or across different military units. The result is a persuasive explanation of otherwise puzzling behavior by authoritarian militaries. The Dictator's Army offers a vital practical tool for those seeking to assess the likely course, costs, and outcomes of future conflicts involving nondemocratic adversaries, allies, or coalition partners.Cornell studies in security affairs.AuthoritarianismMilitary policyDecision makingPolitics and warVietnam War, 1961-1975Political aspectsIran-Iraq War, 1980-1988Political aspectsElectronic books.Authoritarianism.Military policyDecision making.Politics and war.Vietnam War, 1961-1975Political aspects.Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988Political aspects.355/.0335Talmadge Caitlin1042248MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910461149703321The dictator's army2466343UNINA