04994oam 2200709I 450 991045766090332120200520144314.01-315-72964-41-317-54654-71-280-11986-197866135238391-84465-414-110.4324/9781315729640 (CKB)2550000000096500(EBL)1791092(SSID)ssj0000657119(PQKBManifestationID)11371372(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000657119(PQKBWorkID)10656112(PQKB)10089934(MiAaPQ)EBC1791092(Au-PeEL)EBL1791092(CaPaEBR)ebr10553885(CaONFJC)MIL352383(OCoLC)891447359(EXLCZ)99255000000009650020180706h20142010 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrLogic and how it gets that way /Dale JacquetteLondon ;New York :Routledge,2010, 2014.1 online resource (321 p.)"Acumen research editions"--cover.First published in 2010 by Acumen.1-84465-680-2 1-84465-142-8 Includes bibliographical references (p. 289-296) and index.Cover; Half Title; Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication; Table of Contents; Preface; Introduction: Logic, philosophy, analysis; 1 Logical form; Concepts of logic; Logical units and reasoning chains; Deductively valid inference forms; Pragmatic formalization rationale; Formal semantics and logical metatheory; 2 Monkey raisins; An expressive limitation; Surprisingly problematic quantifications; Monkeys and raisins, craisins and kmonkeys; Implications of the paradox; Classical alternatives; Intensional solution to the expressibility problem; The monkey's tale3 The secret life of truth- functionsTruth- functions; Cornerstone of extensional logic; Truth- tables for all and sundry; Truth- function mysteries; Constant truth- functions; Counter- examples to extensionalism; Objections anticipated; Expanding the counter- example family; Formal standards of (non- )truth- functionality; Extensionalism beyond reason and repair; 4 Reference and identity; Identity relata; Cognitive significance of non-trivially true identity statements; Objections to Frege's identity thesis; Self- identity and designation; What's in a name?; Idea, sense and referenceLinsky's critique of FregeIdentical sense and the extensional criterion; Intentionality of meaning; Semantics as a theory of the expression of thought; Reference's debt to identity; 5 Intensional versus extensional logic and semantics; Against the semantic grain; Referring and attributing properties to objects; Disguised definite descriptions; Problems in extensionalist reference models; Semantic oppositions idealized; Poverty of purely formal semantics; Davidson's T-schema; Purely formal semantics; Formalizing intentional meaning relations; Explanatory advantages of intensional semanticsSlingshot arguments6 Truth; What is truth?; Truth and meaning, meaning and truth; Constitutive versus regulative truth; Frege's theory of reified truth and falsehood; Tarski's analysis of truth-conditions in formal languages; Regulative alternative to constitutive truth concepts; Positive correspondence; Truth-makers, truth-breakers; Negative states of affairs; True and false sentences; Conceivability of a null universe; 7 Logical and semantic paradoxes; Why paradoxes matter; Philosophical legacy of inconsistency; Precarious logical integrity; A. Paradoxes of conditionalsB. Self-non-applicationsC. Grelling's paradox contra type theory; D. Inductive paradoxes in a deductive logical framework; Conclusion: Moral lessons of logic; Notes; References; IndexIn this challenging and provocative analysis, Dale Jacquette argues that contemporary philosophy labours under a number of historically inherited delusions about the nature of logic and the philosophical significance of certain formal properties of specific types of logical constructions. Exposing some of the key misconceptions about formal symbolic logic and its relation to thought, language and the world, Jacquette clears the ground of some very well-entrenched philosophical doctrines about the nature of logic, including some of the most fundamental seldom-questioned parts of elementary propLogic, ModernSemanticsParadoxElectronic books.Logic, Modern.Semantics.Paradox.160Jacquette Dale.281704MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910457660903321Logic and how it gets that way2009430UNINA