04091nam 2200661 450 991045681220332120200520144314.01-4426-8985-410.3138/9781442689855(CKB)2550000000019336(OCoLC)632170388(CaPaEBR)ebrary10382003(SSID)ssj0000478733(PQKBManifestationID)11291658(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000478733(PQKBWorkID)10435049(PQKB)10730446(CaPaEBR)431915(CaBNvSL)slc00224353(MiAaPQ)EBC3268220(MiAaPQ)EBC4672721(DE-B1597)465160(OCoLC)1013956040(OCoLC)954123578(DE-B1597)9781442689855(Au-PeEL)EBL4672721(CaPaEBR)ebr11258376(EXLCZ)99255000000001933620160923h20092009 uy 0engurcn|||||||||txtccrReason, truth, and reality /Dan GoldstickToronto, [Ontario] ;Buffalo, [New York] ;London, [England] :University of Toronto Press,2009.©20091 online resource (348 p.) Includes index.0-8020-9594-1 Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Part One: Introductory -- 1. Introduction -- 2. On Moore's Paradox -- 3. On Factuality -- 4. On the Canons of Deductive Inference -- 5. Preliminary Assault on the Philosophy of Empiricism -- Part Two: On the Canons of Induction -- 6. Preliminary Considerations -- 7. Sensationalism -- 8. Naturalism -- 9. Inductivism -- 10. Pragmatism -- 11. Nihilism, Scepticism, and Decisionism -- 12. Possibility, Probability, Negation, and Change -- 13. Causality and Impermanence -- 14. Simplicity -- 15. How to Reason Inductively -- 16. The Case for Universal Impermanence -- 17. That Determinism Is Incontrovertible -- 18. The Pitfall of Metaphysics -- Part Three: On the Canons of Morality -- 19. Preliminary Considerations -- 20. Sensationalism -- 21. Naturalism -- 22. Inductivism -- 23. Pragmatism -- 24. Nihilism, Scepticism, and Decisionism -- 25. Ethics and Induction -- 26. Mores -- 27. 'Consciencelessness' -- 28. Utility -- 29. Comparing Utilities -- 30. Population -- 31. 'Hypocrisy' Stipulatively Defined -- 32. Utilitarianism Proved -- 33. Conclusion: We Each Sit in Judgment -- Appendix 1: 'Tautology' -- Appendix 2: 'Desire' -- IndexDan Goldstick's Reason, Truth, and Reality addresses two questions: what sort of world do we inhabit? and what moral obligations do we have? To answer the questions Goldstick mounts a bold contemporary defense of pre-Kantian rationalism. Basing consideration upon a characterization of reason in its deductive, inductive, and ethical functioning, he asks what must hold good for reason so characterized to be a dependable guide to truth. The conclusions Goldstick draws are threefold. First of all, the argument points to continuous deterministic causality throughout space and time. In the second place, a case is made for universal impermanence. And thirdly, Goldstick claims to establish a basis for the right within a version of utilitarianism supporting the maximum long-term promotion of people's interests. The discussion takes in such traditional rationalist themes as aprioricity, conceivability, and antiscepticism, and such analytic topics as belief-and-desire, truthvaluelessness, and epistemic reliability.ReasonRationalismEthicsElectronic books.Reason.Rationalism.Ethics.128/.33Goldstick D(Daniel),1940-967178MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910456812203321Reason, truth, and reality2195668UNINA