02988oam 2200613I 450 991045560720332120200520144314.01-138-00911-31-280-32378-71-134-96877-90-585-44734-910.4324/9780203404829 (CKB)111087026886936(EBL)178498(OCoLC)52419479(SSID)ssj0000295059(PQKBManifestationID)11214171(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000295059(PQKBWorkID)10315860(PQKB)11489744(MiAaPQ)EBC178498(Au-PeEL)EBL178498(CaPaEBR)ebr10060621(CaONFJC)MIL32378(EXLCZ)9911108702688693620180331d1992 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrEmperor Hirohito and Showa Japan a political biography /Stephen S. LargeLondon ;New York :Routledge,1992.1 online resource (262 p.)The Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese studies seriesDescription based upon print version of record.0-415-03203-2 0-203-40482-3 Includes bibliographical references (p. [231]-241) and index.Emperor Hirohito and Shōwa Japan A Political Biography; Copyright; Contents; Series editor's preface; Acknowledgements; Introduction; 1 The making of the Shōwa Emperor; 2 Japanese aggression and the limits of imperial influence, 1926-1933; 3 The challenge of Shōwa Restoration radicalism, 1931-1937; 4 The Emperor and war, 1937-1940; 5 World war and the imperial will, 1941-1945; 6 The Emperor and the Occupation, 1945-1952; 7 The politics of imperial symbolism, 1952-1970; 8 The Emperor and the imperial institution in late Shōwa Japan, 1970-1989; Conclusion; Notes; Bibliography; IndexEmperor Hirohito reigned for more than sixty years, yet we know little about him or the part he really played in the turbulent history of Showa Japan.Stephen Large draws on a wide range of Japanese and Western sources in his study of Emperor Hirohito's political role in Showa Japan (1926-89). This analysis focuses on key events in his career such as the extent to which he bore responsibility for Japanese aggression in the Pacific in 1941, and explains why Hirohito remains such a contested symbol in Japanese post war politics.Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese studies series.Political scienceJapanJapanPolitics and government1926-1989Electronic books.Political science952.033092Large Stephen S.642966FlBoTFGFlBoTFGBOOK9910455607203321Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan1187852UNINA03769nam 22007092 450 991078621660332120151005020622.01-139-61123-21-107-23808-01-139-62239-01-139-60939-41-139-61309-X1-139-61681-11-139-62611-61-139-50676-5(CKB)2670000000344003(EBL)1099952(OCoLC)843191690(SSID)ssj0000857604(PQKBManifestationID)11437174(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000857604(PQKBWorkID)10867888(PQKB)10148094(UkCbUP)CR9781139506762(MiAaPQ)EBC1099952(Au-PeEL)EBL1099952(CaPaEBR)ebr10695287(CaONFJC)MIL494753(PPN)180973185(EXLCZ)99267000000034400320120515d2013|||| uy| 0engur|||||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierBankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics the myth of neutrality /Christopher Adolph[electronic resource]Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,2013.1 online resource (xxiii, 357 pages) digital, PDF file(s)Cambridge studies in comparative politicsTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).1-107-56709-2 1-107-03261-X Includes bibliographical references and index.Agents, institutions, and the political economy of performance -- Career theories of monetary policy -- Central banker careers and inflation in industrial democracies -- Careers and the monetary policy process: three mechanism tests -- Careers and inflation in developing countries -- How central bankers use their independence -- Partisan governments, labor unions and monetary policy -- The politics of central banker appointment -- The politics of central banker tenure -- Conclusion: the dilemma of discretion.Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.Cambridge studies in comparative politics.Bankers, Bureaucrats, & Central Bank PoliticsMonetary policyBanks and banking, CentralPolitical aspectsBureaucracyMonetary policy.Banks and banking, CentralPolitical aspects.Bureaucracy.332.1/1Adolph Christopher1976-1533629UkCbUPUkCbUPBOOK9910786216603321Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics3780709UNINA