04933nam 2200757Ia 450 991045552650332120200520144314.01-280-77166-697866136824371-84950-537-3(CKB)1000000000765729(EBL)453244(OCoLC)609843537(SSID)ssj0000359160(PQKBManifestationID)11269254(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000359160(PQKBWorkID)10383437(PQKB)10245670(MiAaPQ)EBC453244(Au-PeEL)EBL453244(CaPaEBR)ebr10310674(CaONFJC)MIL368243(EXLCZ)99100000000076572920080925d2008 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrThe economics of innovation[electronic resource] incentives, cooperation and R&D policy /edited by Roberto Cellini, Luca LambertiniBingley Emerald20081 online resource (231 p.)Contributions to economic analysis,0573-8555 ;286Description based upon print version of record.0-444-53255-2 Includes bibliographical references and index.Front cover; The Economics of Innovation; Copyright page; Contents; List of Contributors; The Editors' Preface; Part I: Patents; Chapter 1. Rent Dissipation in R&D Races; Abstract; 1. Introduction; 2. Model; 3. Noncooperative equilibrium; 4. Collusive outcome; 5. Rent dissipation; 6. Policy implications; 7. Conclusions; Acknowledgements; Appendix; References; Chapter 2. Innovation, Duplication, and the Contract Theory of Patents; Abstract; 1. Introduction; 2. The model; 3. Benchmark: no duplication; 4. Duplication with no licensing; 5. Preemptive licensing; 6. Beyond polar cases7. Concluding remarksAcknowledgements; References; Chapter 3. On Patent Licensing; Abstract; 1. Introduction; 2. The screening model of patent licensing; 3. The spatial model for patent licensing; 4. International technology transfer and IPRs; 5. Conclusion; References; Part II: Information and cost sharing; Chapter 4. Spillovers, Stable R&D Cooperations, and Social Welfare; Abstract; 1. Introduction; 2. The models; 3. Stability of R&D cooperations and policy implications; 4. Concluding remarks; Appendix A; References; Chapter 5. Strategic R&D with Uncertainty; Abstract; 1. Introduction2. R&D production3. Product market competition; 4. Policy analysis; 5. Conclusions; References; Chapter 6. Coopting ``Decisive'' Technical Advances; Abstract; 1. Introduction; 2. The benchmark cases; 3. The giving cases; 4. The sharing cases; 5. Conclusions; References; Chapter 7. Efficiency of Joint Enterprises with Internal Bargaining; Abstract; 1. Introduction; 2. Basic model; 3. Illustrative examples; 4. Conclusion; Appendix A; References; Chapter 8. Equilibrium Research Joint Ventures; Abstract; 1. Introduction; 2. The model; 3. Independent R&D; 4. Research joint venture5. RJV formation among asymmetric firms6. Conclusion; Appendix A; References; Part III: Delegation and R&D incentives; Chapter 9. Product and Process Innovation in Differential Games with Managerial Firms; Abstract; 1. Introduction; 2. Product innovation; 3. Process innovation; 4. Conclusions; References; Chapter 10. Delegation in an R&D Game with Spillovers; Abstract; 1. Introduction; 2. The model; 3. The outcomes of the four subgames; 4. The discrete case; 5. The continuous case: a numerical analysis; 6. Further results and extensions of the model; 7. Conclusions; Appendix A; ReferencesSubject IndexA collection of original research papers by a number of industrial organization economists active in the field of Research and Development theory and policy. It covers patent policy, the effects of market structure and the internal organization of the firContributions to economic analysis ;286.Technological innovationsEconomic aspectsIndustrial policyIncentives in industryPatentsEconomic aspectsResearch and development partnershipResearch, IndustrialElectronic books.Technological innovationsEconomic aspects.Industrial policy.Incentives in industry.PatentsEconomic aspects.Research and development partnership.Research, Industrial.338.064Cellini Roberto438185Lambertini Luca81232MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910455526503321The economics of innovation1983242UNINA