02867nam 2200601Ia 450 991045549760332120200520144314.01-280-53347-10-19-534497-90-585-36699-3(CKB)111004366525800(EBL)431117(OCoLC)609831906(SSID)ssj0000250208(PQKBManifestationID)11194178(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000250208(PQKBWorkID)10231100(PQKB)10881594(MiAaPQ)EBC431117(Au-PeEL)EBL431117(CaPaEBR)ebr10278118(CaONFJC)MIL53347(EXLCZ)9911100436652580019910425d1992 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrSprings of action[electronic resource] understanding intentional behavior /Alfred R. MeleNew York Oxford University Press19921 online resource (285 p.)Description based upon print version of record.0-19-507114-X Includes bibliographical references and index.Contents; PART I; 1 Introduction; 2 Mental Causation; 3 Wanting and Wanting Most; 4 P1* and the Plasticity of Motivational Strength; 5 Irresistible Desires; 6 Effective Reasons; PART II; 7 Transition: Introducing Intentions; 8 Intention, Belief, and Intentional Action; 9 Executive States: Settling Things; 10 The Executive Dimension of Proximal Intentions; 11 Intention's Content; 12 Acquiring Intentions; 13 Conclusion: An Unsuccessful Brief Against ""Causalism""; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; R; S; T; V; WTackling some central problems in the philosophy of action, Mele constructs an explanatory model for intentional behavior, locating the place and significance of such mental phenomena as beliefs, desires, reason, and intentions in the etiology of intentional action. Part One comprises a comprehensive examination of the standard treatments of the relations between desires, beliefs, and actions. In Part Two, Mele goes on to develop a subtle and well-defended view that the motivational role of intentions is of a different sort from that of beliefs and desires. Mele, also offers a provocative explAct (Philosophy)Intentionality (Philosophy)IntentionalismElectronic books.Act (Philosophy)Intentionality (Philosophy)Intentionalism.128/.4Mele Alfred R.1951-877919MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910455497603321Springs of action2026873UNINA