05436nam 2200685 450 991045526380332120200520144314.01-282-25855-997866122585580-08-094969-X(CKB)1000000000789550(EBL)453041(OCoLC)429898407(SSID)ssj0000344427(PQKBManifestationID)12092077(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000344427(PQKBWorkID)10313288(PQKB)10784767(MiAaPQ)EBC4434963(MiAaPQ)EBC453041(PPN)182566676(Au-PeEL)EBL4434963(CaPaEBR)ebr10318957(CaONFJC)MIL225855(OCoLC)948393426(EXLCZ)99100000000078955020160428h20092009 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrWhat went wrong? case histories of process plant disasters and how they could have been avoided /Trevor KletzFifth edition.Amsterdam, [Netherlands] :Gulf Professional Publishing,2009.©20091 online resource (641 p.)Description based upon print version of record.1-4933-0390-2 1-85617-531-6 Includes bibliographical references and index.Front Cover; What Went Wrong?; Copyright Page; Contents; Acknowledgments; Preface; Units and Nomenclature; PART A: WHAT WENT WRONG?; Chapter 1. Preparation for Maintenance; 1.1 Isolation; 1.2 Identification; 1.3 Removal of Hazards; 1.4 Procedures Not Followed; 1.5 Quality of Maintenance; 1.6 A Personal Note; Chapter 2. Modifications; 2.1 Startup Modifications; 2.2 Minor Modifications; 2.3 Modifications Made during Maintenance; 2.4 Temporary Modifications; 2.5 Sanctioned Modifications; 2.6 Process Modifications; 2.7 New Tools; 2.8 Organizational Changes; 2.9 Gradual Changes2.10 Modification Chains2.11 Modifications Made to Improve the Environment; 2.12 Control of Modifications; Chapter 3. Accidents Said to Be Due to Human Error; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Accidents That Could Be Prevented by Changing the Plant Design or Method of Working; 3.3 Accidents That Could Be Prevented by Better Training; Chapter 4. Labeling; 4.1 Labeling of Equipment; 4.2 Labeling of Instruments; 4.3 Labeling of Chemicals; 4.4 Labels Not Understood; Chapter 5. Storage Tanks; 5.1 Overfilling; 5.2 Overpressuring; 5.3 Sucking In; 5.4 Explosions; 5.5 Floating-Roof Tanks5.6 Miscellaneous Incidents5.7 Fiberglass-Reinforced (FRP) Tanks; Chapter 6. Stacks; 6.1 Stack Explosions; 6.2 Blocked Stacks; 6.3 Heat Radiation; Chapter 7. Leaks; 7.1 Some Common Sources of Leaks; 7.2 Control of Leaks; 7.3 Leaks onto Water, Wet Ground, or Insulation; 7.4 Detection of Leaks; 7.5 Fugitive Emissions; Chapter 8. Liquefied Flammable Gases; 8.1 Major Leaks; 8.2 Minor Leaks; 8.3 Other Leaks; 8.4 Safety in the Design of Plants Handling Liquefied Light Hydrocarbons; Chapter 9. Pipe and Vessel Failures; 9.1 Pipe Failures; 9.2 Pressure Vessel Failures; Chapter 10. Other Equipment10.1 Centrifuges10.2 Pumps; 10.3 Air Coolers; 10.4 Relief Valves; 10.5 Heat Exchangers; 10.6 Cooling Towers; 10.7 Furnaces; Chapter 11. Entry to Vessels; 11.1 Vessels Not Freed from Hazardous Material; 11.2 Hazardous Materials Introduced; 11.3 Vessels Not Isolated from Sources of Danger; 11.4 Unauthorized Entry; 11.5 Entry into Vessels with Irrespirable Atmospheres; 11.6 Rescue; 11.7 Analysis of Vessel Atmosphere; 11.8 What Is a Confined Space?; 11.9 Every Possible Error; Chapter 12. Hazards of Common Materials; 12.1 Compressed Air; 12.2 Water; 12.3 Nitrogen12.4 Heavy Oils (Including Heat Transfer Oils)Chapter 13. Tank Trucks and Cars; 13.1 Overfilling; 13.2 Burst Hoses; 13.3 Fires and Explosions; 13.4 Liquefied Flammable Gases; 13.5 Compressed Air; 13.6 Tipping Up; 13.7 Emptying into or Filling from the Wrong Place; 13.8 Contact with Live Power Lines; Chapter 14. Testing of Trips and Other Protective Systems; 14.1 Testing Should Be Thorough; 14.2 All Protective Equipment Should Be Tested; 14.3 Testing Can Be Overdone; 14.4 Protective Systems Should Not Reset Themselves; 14.5 Trips Should Not Be Disarmed without Authorization14.6 Instruments Should Measure Directly What We Need to Know""What Went Wrong?"" has revolutionized the way industry views safety. The new edition continues and extends the wisdom, innovations and strategies of previous editions, by introducing new material on recent incidents, and adding an extensive new section that shows how many accidents occur through simple miscommunications within the organization, and how straightforward changes in design can often remove or reduce opportunities for human errors. Kletz' approach to learning as deeply as possible from previous experiences is made yet more valuable in this new edition, which for theChemical plantsAccidentsElectronic books.Chemical plantsAccidents.363.11/966Kletz Trevor A.14333MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910455263803321What went wrong1942226UNINA