04154nam 22007332 450 991045266980332120151005020622.01-139-88828-51-139-56417-X1-139-55557-X1-139-55432-81-139-01766-71-139-54936-71-139-55186-81-283-63826-61-139-55061-6(CKB)2550000000707769(EBL)989130(OCoLC)813396539(SSID)ssj0000753495(PQKBManifestationID)11494744(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000753495(PQKBWorkID)10814995(PQKB)10570718(UkCbUP)CR9781139017664(MiAaPQ)EBC989130(PPN)193798840(Au-PeEL)EBL989130(CaPaEBR)ebr10608465(CaONFJC)MIL395072(EXLCZ)99255000000070776920110216d2012|||| uy| 0engur|||||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierHigh courts and economic governance in Argentina and Brazil /Diana Kapiszewski, University of California, Irvine[electronic resource]Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,2012.1 online resource (xi, 289 pages) digital, PDF file(s)Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).1-107-00828-X Includes bibliographical references and index.1. High court-elected branch institutions in Latin America -- 2. Setting the scene: Latin America's triple transition and the judicialization of economic governance -- 3. Politicization and the political court in Argentina -- 4. Professionalism and the statesman court in Brazil -- 5. The political court and high court submission and inter-branch confrontation in Argentina -- 6. The statesman court and inter-branch accommodation in Brazil -- 7. Conclusions and implications.High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil analyzes how high courts and elected leaders in Latin America interacted over neoliberal restructuring, one of the most significant socioeconomic transformations in recent decades. Courts face a critical choice when deciding cases concerning national economic policy, weighing rule of law concerns against economic imperatives. Elected leaders confront equally difficult dilemmas when courts issue decisions challenging their actions. Based on extensive fieldwork in Argentina and Brazil, this study identifies striking variation in inter-branch interactions between the two countries. In Argentina, while the high court often defers to politicians in the economic realm, inter-branch relations are punctuated by tense bouts of conflict. The Brazilian high court and elected officials, by contrast, routinely accommodate one another in their decisions about economic policy. Diana Kapiszewski argues that the two high courts' contrasting characters - political in Argentina and statesman-like in Brazil - shape their decisions on controversial cases and condition how elected leaders respond to their rulings, channeling inter-branch interactions into persistent patterns.High Courts & Economic Governance in Argentina & BrazilCourts of last resortBrazilCourts of last resortArgentinaPolitical questions and judicial powerArgentinaPolitical questions and judicial powerBrazilBrazilEconomic policyArgentinaEconomic policyCourts of last resortCourts of last resortPolitical questions and judicial powerPolitical questions and judicial power343.8107/0269Kapiszewski Diana1035215UkCbUPUkCbUPBOOK9910452669803321High courts and economic governance in Argentina and Brazil2454794UNINA