02384nam 2200673 a 450 991045224680332120200520144314.00-292-79701-X(CKB)1000000000456571(SSID)ssj0000130295(PQKBManifestationID)11148766(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000130295(PQKBWorkID)10080509(PQKB)11773479(MiAaPQ)EBC3443116(Au-PeEL)EBL3443116(CaPaEBR)ebr10194794(OCoLC)298790769(EXLCZ)99100000000045657120040517d2005 ub 0engurcn|||||||||txtccrConversations with Texas writers[electronic resource] /edited by Frances Leonard and Ramona Cearley for Humanities Texas ; photographs by Ramona Cearley ; introduction and essays by Joe Holley1st ed.Austin University of Texas Press2005ix, 422 p. illJack and Doris Smothers series in Texas history, life, and culture ;no. 16Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph0-292-70614-6 Includes bibliographical references and index.Jack and Doris Smothers series in Texas history, life, and culture ;no. 16.American literatureTexasHistory and criticismTheory, etcAuthors, American20th centuryInterviewsAuthors, American21st centuryInterviewsAuthors, AmericanHomes and hauntsTexasAuthorshipTexasIntellectual lifeTexasIn literatureElectronic books.American literatureHistory and criticismTheory, etc.Authors, AmericanAuthors, AmericanAuthors, AmericanHomes and hauntsAuthorship.810.9/9764Leonard Frances McNeely1936-963663Cearley Ramona1956-963664Holley Joe933884Humanities Texas.MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910452246803321Conversations with Texas writers2184948UNINA02756nam 2200493Ia 450 991069620570332120080618114853.0(CKB)5470000002376769(OCoLC)183408773(EXLCZ)99547000000237676920071212d2007 ua 0engurbn|||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierForce and restraint in strategic deterrence[electronic resource] a game-theorist's perspective /Roger B. Myerson[Carlisle Barracks, PA] :[Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College],[2007]vi, 25 pages digital, PDF fileAdvancing strategic thought seriesTitle from title screen (viewed on Dec. 7, 2007)."November 2007."Includes bibliographical references (page 25).Intuitive arguments against multilateral constraints on American actions -- Game theory as a form of analytical narrative -- A simple model of the strategic deterrence problem -- Judging reputations -- Reputations for restraint and resolve -- Failure of deterrence: stimulating militarism by denying restraint -- Reconsidering the rationality assumption -- Lessons for patriots."In a dangerous world, we need to think very carefully about how military force is used. Game theory can serve us in such analyses by providing a framework for probing the inextricable connections between our adversaries' decision problems and our own. To illustrate the power of game theory, the author focuses on a vital question that confronts American policymakers today: what determines why an application of military force, which was intended to deter potential adversaries, sometimes instead stimulates them to more militant reactions against us? When we feel that force is necessary, what can we do to minimize the risk of such adverse reactions?" -- p. v.Force and restraint in strategic deterrence Deterrence (Strategy)Game theoryGames of strategy (Mathematics)International relationsDeterrence (Strategy)Mathematical modelsDeterrence (Strategy)Game theory.Games of strategy (Mathematics)International relations.Deterrence (Strategy)Mathematical models.Myerson Roger B149749Army War College (U.S.).Strategic Studies Institute.GPOGPOBOOK9910696205703321Force and restraint in strategic deterrence3476096UNINA