04510nam 22006254a 450 991045214360332120200520144314.01-282-09814-497866120981470-262-28330-11-4294-1310-7(CKB)1000000000467382(OCoLC)76064835(CaPaEBR)ebrary10173688(SSID)ssj0000268092(PQKBManifestationID)11191904(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000268092(PQKBWorkID)10212525(PQKB)10978431(MiAaPQ)EBC3338627(OCoLC)76064835(OCoLC)148713672(OCoLC)191936524(OCoLC)473741566(OCoLC)607730910(OCoLC)614959025(OCoLC)638802339(OCoLC)638802346(OCoLC)648225973(OCoLC)722565856(OCoLC)728037310(OCoLC)961665340(OCoLC)962578742(OCoLC)988511894(OCoLC)991949357(OCoLC)992057936(OCoLC)1037917722(OCoLC)1038608760(OCoLC)1055335498(OCoLC)1058338590(OCoLC)1064011859(OCoLC)1081274727(OCoLC-P)76064835(MaCbMITP)7134(Au-PeEL)EBL3338627(CaPaEBR)ebr10173688(CaONFJC)MIL209814(EXLCZ)99100000000046738220060109d2006 uy 0engurcn|||||||||txtccrVisual versions[electronic resource] /Robert SchwartzCambridge, Mass. MIT Pressc20061 online resource (278 p.) "A Bradford book."0-262-19544-5 Includes bibliographical references and index.Introduction --1Seeing distance from a Berkeleian perspective --2Size --3Making maximum sense of "minimum sensible" --4Heterogeneity and the senses --5What Berkeley sees in the man born blind --6The role of inference in vision --7Making occlusion more transparent --8Directed perception --9Representation and resemblance --10Pictures, puzzles, and paradigms --11Vision and cognition in picture perception --12The concept of an "object" in perception and cognition --13Avoiding errors about errors --14Pluralist perspectives on perceptual error --15An Austinian look at the "objects of perception."These essays by Robert Schwartz on topics in the theory of vision are written from a pragmatic perspective. The issues and arguments will interest both philosophers and psychologists, covering new ground and bridging gaps between these disciplines. Schwartz begins historically, with discussions of problems raised and solutions offered in Bishop Berkeley's writings on vision, presenting Berkeley's views on spatial perception and the qualitative aspects of sensory experience in the context of recent theoretical and empirical work in vision theory. Schwartz then turns to debates in both the philosophical and psychological literature over the view that perception is inferential and thus "indirect." Critically surveying competing characterizations of the idea of "inferential processes" he argues the need either to reframe radically the question or drop the issue. Next, Schwartz discusses pictorial representation and research on picture perception. Drawing on the work of Nelson Goodman, Schwartz explains and defends the advantages of a symbolic approach to both topics. Finally, he examines the quagmires that often develop when metaphysical concerns about the "real" and our ability to perceive it infect discussions and claims in the theory of vision. After analyzing issues arising in current psychological research on "object" perception, Schwartz turns to debates over the supposed essential nature of colors. An appreciation of the empirical and theoretical work on color perception suggests that there is no single or privileged analysis of the notion of "real colors." Schwartz circles back in the end to what he calls "that old chestnut of the philosophy of perception"--controversies over "the objects of perception"--and takes an Austinian look at the topic.VisionVisual perceptionElectronic books.Vision.Visual perception.121/.35Schwartz Robert1940-23284MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910452143603321Visual versions2168442UNINA