02738nam 2200637Ia 450 991045179030332120200520144314.00-8157-3392-5(CKB)1000000000465274(EBL)1172500(OCoLC)614962880(SSID)ssj0000104282(PQKBManifestationID)11140817(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000104282(PQKBWorkID)10079331(PQKB)10948428(MiAaPQ)EBC1172500(OCoLC)74337169(MdBmJHUP)muse35343(Au-PeEL)EBL1172500(CaPaEBR)ebr10141083(EXLCZ)99100000000046527420060413d2006 uy 0engur|||||||nn|ntxtccrAntitrust policy and vertical restraints[electronic resource] /Robert W. Hahn, editorWashington, D.C. AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studiesc20061 online resource (107 p.)Description based upon print version of record.0-8157-3391-7 Includes bibliographical references and index.Introduction / Robert W. Hahn -- Two tales of bundling : implications for the application of antitrust law to bundled discounts / Bruce H. Kobayashi -- Why tie an essential good? / Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman -- Tying : the poster child for antitrust modernization / David S. Evans.Antitrust law is intended to protect consumer welfare and foster competition. At first glance, however, it is often unclear whether certain business practices have positive or detrimental effects. Businesses frequently engage in activities that may appear anticompetitive on the surface, but are actually beneficial to consumers. Business tying practices, for example, make the sale of one product conditional upon the sale of another product. This practice can either deprive consumers of choice and drive up prices or lower costs and improve convenience. Therefore, it is critical that policymakersCompetitionCommodity controlTie-ins (Marketing)MonopoliesAntitrust lawElectronic books.Competition.Commodity control.Tie-ins (Marketing)Monopolies.Antitrust law.338.82Hahn Robert William147098MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910451790303321Antitrust policy and vertical restraints2485728UNINA