04306nam 22007091c 450 991045140550332120200115203623.01-4725-5925-81-280-80812-897866108081201-84731-071-010.5040/9781472559258(CKB)1000000000338525(EBL)270761(OCoLC)335291910(SSID)ssj0000210905(PQKBManifestationID)12067414(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000210905(PQKBWorkID)10291592(PQKB)10272127(MiAaPQ)EBC1772544(MiAaPQ)EBC270761(Au-PeEL)EBL1772544(CaPaEBR)ebr10276114(CaONFJC)MIL80812(OCoLC)893332154(OCoLC)191793277(UtOrBLW)bpp09258051(Au-PeEL)EBL270761(EXLCZ)99100000000033852520150227d2002 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrNew visions of crime victims edited by Carolyn Hoyle and Richard Young1st ed.Oxford Portland, Oregon Hart Publishing 2002.1 online resource (256 p.)Description based upon print version of record.1-84113-521-6 1-84113-280-2 Includes bibliographical references1. On Becoming a Victim -- Paul Rock -- 2. Male Victims of Rape: Responses to a Perceived Threat to Masculinity -- Stephanie Allen -- 3. Victims of Paramilitary Punishment Attacks in Belfast -- Heather Hamill -- 4. Female-on-Male Domestic Violence: Uncommon or Ignored? -- Ann Grady -- 5. Securing Restorative Justice for the 'Non-Participating' Victim -- Carolyn Hoyle -- 6. Testing the Limits of Restorative Justice: The Case of Corporate Victims -- Richard Young -- 7. The Trial of Rose West: Contesting Notions of Victimhood -- Jo Winter -- 8. Victim Participation in an Exclusionary Criminal Justice System -- Andrew SandersThis innovative collection presents original theoretical analyses and previously unpublished empirical research on criminal victimisation. Following an overview of the development and deficiencies of victimology,subsequent chapters present more detailed challenges to stereotypical conceptions of victimisation through their focus on: male victims of domestic violence; victims of male-on-male rape; corporate victims; and the 'victim-offenders' who are the recipients of IRA punishment beatings. The second half of the book considers criminal justice responses to victimisation, focusing in particular on the potential of, and limits to, restorative justice, the social (and gendered) construction of the victim within contested trials and the exclusionary nature of current 'victim-centred' initiatives. This important book will further the debate on how we conceptualise victims as well as their appropriate role within the criminal justice system. New Visions of Crime Victims will be of interest to academics, students, criminal justice practitioners and policy-makers. It has particular implications for scholarship in the fields of victimology, restorative justice and feminist approaches to criminology and criminal justice. The integration of work by established criminologists, such as Carolyn Hoyle, Paul Rock, Andrew Sanders and Richard Young with that of young, previously unpublished scholars, makes for an interesting and stimulating book. As well as being a valuable addition to the literature, it can be used to support undergraduate and postgraduate courses in criminal justice and criminologyVictims of crimesGreat BritainCrime & criminologyCriminal justice, Administration ofGreat BritainElectronic books.Victims of crimesCriminal justice, Administration of362.88/0941Hoyle CarolynYoung Richard(Richard P.),UtOrBLWUtOrBLWUkLoBPBOOK9910451405503321New visions of crime victims2451469UNINA10567nam 22004573 450 991086523710332120240603084507.03-031-57353-6(MiAaPQ)EBC31359045(Au-PeEL)EBL31359045(CKB)32200404200041(EXLCZ)993220040420004120240603d2024 uy 0engurcnu||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierThe Roles of Representation in Visual Perception1st ed.Cham :Springer International Publishing AG,2024.©2024.1 online resource (471 pages)Synthese Library ;v.4863-031-57352-8 Intro -- Contents -- Chapter 1: The Role of Representation in Visual Perception: An Introduction -- 1.1 The Question of the Role of Representation -- 1.2 Cognitive and Contextual Influences on Perceptual Representation -- 1.3 What Do Perceptual Representations Represent? -- 1.4 Against Representation: Direct Relational Views -- 1.5 Revisiting Sense-Datum Theories and Other Indirect Representational Views -- 1.6 The Role of Enactive and Embodied Representations in Perception -- References -- Part I: Cognitive and Contextual Influences on Perceptual Representation -- Chapter 2: Joint Perception Needs Representations -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.1.1 Problem 1: Do We See Things in the Same Way? -- 2.1.2 Problem 2: How Can We Ever Look at the Same Thing? -- 2.1.3 New Problem: Is My Perception Different Because We Both Perceive Together? -- 2.2 Joint Perception from the Armchair: Joint Visibility -- 2.3 Joint Perception from the Armchair: The Role of Representations -- 2.3.1 Can Representations Explain Joint Perception? -- 2.3.2 Joint Visibility Without Representations? -- 2.4 Joint Perception: Empirical Evidence -- 2.4.1 Perceptual Processing Is Faster During Joint Perception -- 2.4.2 Visual Perspective Is Different During Joint Perception -- 2.4.3 Perceptual Categorisation Is Different During Joint Perception -- 2.4.4 Perceptual Detection Is Different During Joint Perception -- 2.4.5 Higher-Level Properties Also Are Different During Joint Perception -- 2.4.6 Interim Summary -- 2.5 Does Social Sensitivity Require Representations? -- 2.6 Conclusion - Representing the World Jointly -- References -- Chapter 3: The Role of Long-Term Memory in Visual Perception -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Role of Schematic Memory in Perception -- 3.3 Template Tuning and Expertise -- 3.4 The Role of Episodic Memory Activation in Visual Discrimination.3.5 Consequences for Theories of Visual Perception -- 3.6 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 4: Attention and Representational Precision -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Spatial Resolution, Precision and Range Content -- 4.3 Spatial Attention and Featural Precision -- 4.4 Precise Inattentive Representations -- 4.5 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Chapter 5: Uncertainty in Blurry Vision -- 5.1 Characteristics of Blurry Vision -- 5.1.1 Borderline Elements -- 5.1.2 Boundarylessness -- 5.1.3 Filled-in Contents -- 5.2 Criticisms of Some Extant Accounts of Blurry Experience -- 5.2.1 Misrepresentations of Fuzziness -- 5.2.2 Failure to Represent -- 5.2.3 Indeterminate Representation -- 5.2.4 Inconsistent Representations -- 5.2.5 Hybrid Views -- 5.3 Uncertain Perceptual Attitudes in Blurry Vision -- 5.3.1 Attitudes and Manners of Representation -- 5.3.2 Unclarity and Uncertainty -- 5.4 Conclusion -- References -- Part II: What Do Perceptual Representations Represent? -- Chapter 6: Representation, Attention, and Perceptual Learning -- 6.1 The Basics of the Debate -- 6.2 The Goldilocks Test -- 6.3 The New Attention Shift Strategy -- 6.3.1 Perceptual Learning -- 6.3.2 The Challenge to the Rich Content View from Perceptual Learning -- 6.4 Representing High-Level Properties Through Perceptual Learning -- 6.4.1 Recognition Does Not Require Cognition -- 6.4.2 Attentional Weights Can Come to Carry Information About High-Level Properties -- 6.4.3 Perceptual Category Detectors Represent High-Level Properties -- 6.4.4 High-Level Properties vs. Mere Appearance Properties -- 6.4.5 Lucky Patterns -- 6.5 Revisiting Dretske´s Goldilocks Test -- 6.6 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 7: Singular Contents (With and Without Objects) -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Background -- 7.3 The Puzzle of Singular Experience -- 7.4 Phenomenal Intentionality -- 7.5 Self-Ascriptivism.7.6 Singular Phenomenal and Derived Contents -- 7.7 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 8: Kaplanianism -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Kaplanianism -- 8.3 Overcoming the Problems of Representationalism -- 8.3.1 The Problem of Generic Hallucination -- 8.3.2 The Particularity Problem -- 8.3.3 The Problem of Phenomenal Externalism -- 8.3.4 The Inverted Earth Problem -- 8.3.5 The Cosmic Swampbrain Problem -- 8.4 Overcoming the Problems of the Internal Physical State View -- 8.4.1 The Problem of Essential External Directedness -- 8.4.2 The Problem of Conscious Causation -- 8.5 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Chapter 9: Reliable Color Misrepresentation and Color Vision -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Tracking Theories of Mental Representation -- 9.3 Occasional and Reliable Misrepresentation -- 9.4 Color Vision, Measuring Devices, and Selective Pressure -- 9.5 The Evolution of Human Vision -- 9.6 Color Misrepresentation -- 9.7 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 10: Subjective Factors in the Perception of Size -- 10.1 Some Representational Approaches to Size Perception -- 10.2 Two Comparative Examples -- 10.3 Indexing as a Representationalist Response -- 10.4 Representationalism and Phenomenal Variation -- References -- Part III: Against Representation: Direct Relational Views -- Chapter 11: Naïve Realism as Psychosemantics -- References -- Chapter 12: The Epistemic Value of Cognitive Contact with Reality -- References -- Chapter 13: How to Be a Direct Realist -- 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 Resisting Arguments Against Direct Realism -- 13.2.1 Scientific Arguments Against Direct Realism -- 13.2.2 Philosophical Arguments Against Direct Realism -- 13.3 Resisting Disjunctivism -- 13.4 Direct Realism and Neo-Pyrrhonism -- 13.5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 14: Get Acquainted with Naïve Idealism -- 14.1 Introduction -- 14.2 Idealism -- 14.3 Perception.14.4 Acquaintance with the World -- 14.4.1 Idealist Acquaintance -- 14.4.2 Naïve Realist Acquaintance -- 14.5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 15: What Does Phenomenal Particularity Commit Us to? -- 15.1 The Perception Argument -- 15.2 Dividing Phenomenal Character -- 15.3 Divided Phenomenal Characters and Naive Realism -- 15.4 Particularity with Introspective Knowability? -- 15.5 What Is Included in Phenomenal Character? -- References -- Part IV: Revisiting Indirect Realist Theories Including Sense-Datum Theories -- Chapter 16: Spatial Representational Theories of Visual Perception -- 16.1 Introduction -- 16.2 Section 1 The Nature of Representation -- 16.3 Section 2 The Object of Visual Perception -- 16.4 Section 3 Issues Concerning the ``Theory-Ladennness´´ of Visual Perception -- 16.5 Section 4 Phenomenal Visual Space and Spatial Representational Realism -- 16.6 Section 5 Linguistic and Epistemological Lessons -- References -- Chapter 17: Information Flow, Representation, and Awareness -- 17.1 Overview -- 17.2 Varieties of Information -- 17.3 Inherent Information Flow -- 17.4 Inherent Information as Representation -- 17.5 The Information Content of Awareness -- 17.6 The Problem of Representing Scale -- 17.7 The Problem of Representing Space and Time -- 17.8 Robotic Interlude -- 17.9 Phenomenal Character and Representational Properties as Awareness of a Controlled Internal Model -- 17.10 The Internal Neural Model of the World -- 17.11 The Internal Model Is Both the Content and the Medium of Our Perceptual Awareness -- 17.12 Wait, That´s Not What I Meant! -- 17.12.1 Representation -- 17.12.2 Cognitive Penetration -- 17.12.2.1 Discussion of the Result -- 17.12.3 Adverbialism -- 17.12.3.1 Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Character -- 17.12.4 Direct vs. Indirect Realism -- 17.12.4.1 Justification of Perceptual Belief -- 17.13 Summary -- References.Chapter 18: Seeing Matters: The Remarkable Relevance of the Object-Representation Relationship to Science and to Society! -- 18.1 The Basic Issue: Distal Object, Conscious-Experiential Representation -- 18.2 Rules of Engagement, Reasons for Engagement! -- 18.3 New Symbol-Based Notation: Conscious Experience Distinguished from Object -- 18.4 Direct Realism, Symbolically Stated -- 18.5 Simple Physics-Based Arguments Against Direct Realism -- 18.5.1 Energy Conservation -- 18.5.2 Experiential Geometry -- 18.5.3 Speech Acts: How Does Conscious-Experiential Information `Get Into´ Brain-Dynamics? -- 18.6 A Directist Concern: Knowing the World -- 18.7 Indirect Realism, Symbolically Stated: New Symbolism for Encoding -- 18.8 Dynamically-Conventional Physics Denies Scientifically-Reliable Report of Experience -- 18.9 But We Know We Can Report on Our Conscious Experiences! -- 18.10 Impossibility of a Dynamically-Conventional Experimental Science of Conscious Experience -- 18.11 From Experimental Report, to States of Consciousness, to Definitions of Consciousness! -- 18.12 Physics, Revisited: Dynamically-Conventional Science Can´t Be (Conventionally) Reliable -- 18.13 Is Reality Dynamically Conventional? An Experimental Question! -- 18.14 Experimental Traction on the Direct/Indirect Debate?! -- 18.15 From the Foundations of Science to the Foundations of Society -- References -- Chapter 19: On the Analysis of Brentano´s Intentional Inexistence in Light of the Historical Background -- References -- Part V: The Roles of Enactive and Embodied Representations in Perception -- Chapter 20: Seeing What to Do: Embodied Instructive Representations in Vision -- 20.1 Desiderata -- 20.1.1 D1. Perceptual-Cognitive Grasp -- 20.1.2 D2. Success & -- Failure -- 20.1.3 D3. Phenomenology -- 20.1.4 D4. Directness -- 20.1.5 D5. Animals -- 20.2 Orthodox Representationalism &.Allorepresentations.Synthese LibraryFrench Robert1119645Brogaard Berit1672353MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910865237103321The Roles of Representation in Visual Perception4169793UNINA