03379nam 22004935 450 991033783440332120230810164443.03-030-15590-010.1007/978-3-030-15590-2(CKB)4100000008424434(MiAaPQ)EBC5789419(DE-He213)978-3-030-15590-2(PPN)258303824(EXLCZ)99410000000842443420190612d2019 u| 0engurcnu||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierInterpretation without Truth A Realistic Enquiry /by Pierluigi Chiassoni1st ed. 2019.Cham :Springer International Publishing :Imprint: Springer,2019.1 online resource (284 pages)Law and Philosophy Library,2215-0315 ;1283-030-15588-9 1. Introduction: The Path of Analytical Realism -- 2. Interpretation, Truth, and the Logical Forms of Interpretive Discourse -- 3. Interpretive Games -- 4. Taking Context Seriously -- 5. Frames v. Containers -- 6. Towards Pragmatic Realism -- 7. Legal Gaps -- 8. Judicial Fictions -- 9. Precedent -- 10. Defeasibility and Legal Indeterminacy -- 11. Legislation.This book engages in an analytical and realistic enquiry into legal interpretation and a selection of related matters including legal gaps, judicial fictions, judicial precedent, legal defeasibility, and legislation. Chapter 1 provides an outline of the central theoretical and methodological tenets of analytical realism. Chapter 2 presents a conceptual apparatus concerning the phenomenon of legal interpretation, which it subsequently applies to investigate the truth-in-legal-interpretation issue. Chapters 3 to 6 argue for a theory of legal interpretation - pragmatic realism - by outlining a theory of interpretive games, revisiting the debate between literalism and contextualism in contemporary philosophy of language, and underscoring the many shortcomings of the container-retrieval view and pragmatic formalism. In turn, Chapter 7, focusing on comparative legal theory, advocates an interpretation-sensitive theory of legal gaps, as opposed to purely normativist ones. Chapter 8 explores the connection between judicial reasoning and judicial fictions, casting light on the structure and purpose of fictional reasoning. Chapter 9 provides an analytical enquiry into judicial precedent, examining a variety of ideal-typical systems in terms of their normative or de iure relevance. Chapter 10 addresses defeasibility and legal indeterminacy. In closing, Chapter 11 highlights the central tenets of a realistic theory of legislation.Law and Philosophy Library,2215-0315 ;128LawPhilosophyLawHistoryTheories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal HistoryPhilosophy of LawLawPhilosophy.LawHistory.Theories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History.Philosophy of Law.340.1340.115Chiassoni Pierluigiauthttp://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut254330BOOK9910337834403321Interpretation without Truth1756618UNINA