04017nam 22005415 450 991033768360332120200706124917.03-319-95507-110.1007/978-3-319-95507-0(CKB)4100000008280620(MiAaPQ)EBC5780314(DE-He213)978-3-319-95507-0(EXLCZ)99410000000828062020190524d2019 u| 0engurcnu||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierStructural Rationality and Other Essays on Practical Reason /by Julian Nida-Rümelin1st ed. 2019.Cham :Springer International Publishing :Imprint: Springer,2019.1 online resource (144 pages)Theory and Decision Library A:, Rational Choice in Practical Philosophy and Philosophy of Science,0921-3384 ;523-319-95506-3 Introduction and Overview -- Chapter1. Acting on Beliefs -- Chapter2. Structures of Agency -- Chapter3. Reasons for Action -- Chapter4. Cooperation -- Chapter5. Communication -- Chapter6. Structural Intentions -- Chapter7. Weakness of Will -- Chapter8. Structural Coherence.In this book, the author shows that it is necessary to enrich the conceptual frame of the theory of rational choice beyond consequentialism. He argues that consequentialism as a general theory of rational action fails and that this does not force us into the dichotomy teleology vs deontology. The unity of practical reason can be saved without consequentialism. In the process, he presents insightful criticism of standard models of action and rational choice. This will help readers discover a new perspective on the theory of rationality. The approach is radical: It transcends the reductive narrowness of instrumental rationality without denying its practical impact. Actions do exist that are outlined in accordance to utility maximizing or even self-interest maximizing. Yet, not all actions are to be understood in these terms. Actions oriented around social roles, for example, cannot count as irrational only because there is no known underlying maximizing heuristic. The concept of bounded rationality tries to embed instrumental rationality into a form of life to highlight limits of our cognitive capabilities and selective perceptions. However, the agent is still left within the realm of cost-benefit-reasoning. The idea of social preferences or meta-preferences cannot encompass the plurality of human actions. According to the author they ignore the plurality of reasons that drive agency. Hence, they coerce agency in fitting into a theory that undermines humanity. His theory of structural rationality acknowledges lifeworld patterns of interaction and meaning. .Theory and Decision Library A:, Rational Choice in Practical Philosophy and Philosophy of Science,0921-3384 ;52Philosophy and social sciencesAnalysis (Philosophy)PhilosophyTheory (Philosophy)Philosophy of the Social Scienceshttps://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E36000Analytic Philosophyhttps://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E39000Philosophical Methodologyhttps://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E50000Philosophy and social sciences.Analysis (Philosophy)Philosophy.Theory (Philosophy)Philosophy of the Social Sciences.Analytic Philosophy.Philosophical Methodology.146.4Nida-Rümelin Julianauthttp://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut428781BOOK9910337683603321Structural Rationality and Other Essays on Practical Reason2179887UNINA