04062nam 22006975 450 991029849390332120200920111903.081-322-2029-310.1007/978-81-322-2029-9(CKB)3710000000311829(EBL)1966210(OCoLC)897466475(SSID)ssj0001407887(PQKBManifestationID)11876789(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001407887(PQKBWorkID)11413031(PQKB)10010397(DE-He213)978-81-322-2029-9(MiAaPQ)EBC1966210(PPN)183148150(EXLCZ)99371000000031182920141201d2015 u| 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrEconomic Analysis of Liability Rules[electronic resource] /by Satish Kumar Jain1st ed. 2015.New Delhi :Springer India :Imprint: Springer,2015.1 online resource (184 p.)Description based upon print version of record.81-322-2028-5 Includes bibliographical references and index.Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Efficiency Criteria -- Chapter 3. The Structure of Efficient Liability Rules -- Chapter 4. Decoupled Liability and Efficiency -- Chapter 5. Negligence as Failure to Take Some Cost-Justified Precaution -- Chapter 6. The Structure of Incremental Liability Rules -- Chapter 7. The Negligence Rule -- Chapter 8. Decomposition of Loss and a Class of Negligence Rules -- Chapter 9. Multiple Injurers and Victims -- Chapter 10. Epilogue.This book focuses on the analysis of liability rules of tort law from an efficiency perspective, presenting a comprehensive analysis of these rules in a self-contained and rigorous yet accessible manner. It establishes general results on the efficiency of liability rules, including complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rules. The book also establishes that the untaken precaution approach and decoupled liability are incompatible with efficiency. The economic analysis of tort law has established that for efficiency it is necessary that each party to the interaction must be made to internalize the harm resulting from the interaction. The characterization and impossibility theorems presented in this book establish that, in addition to internalization of the harm by each party, there are two additional requirements for efficiency. Firstly, rules must be immune from strategic manipulation. Secondly, rules must entail closure with respect to the parties involved in the interaction giving rise to the negative externality, i.e., the liability must not be decoupled.Law and economicsCivil procedureCriminal lawEconomicsLaw and Economicshttps://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/W39000Civil Procedure Lawhttps://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/R12034Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Lawhttps://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/R13006Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methodshttps://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/W29000Law and economics.Civil procedure.Criminal law.Economics.Law and Economics.Civil Procedure Law.Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law.Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.330330.1345347.05Jain Satish Kumarauthttp://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut781850BOOK9910298493903321Economic Analysis of Liability Rules2546072UNINA