02765 am 22005413u 450 991027973640332120170926030608.00-8101-6782-4(CKB)2670000000560416(SSID)ssj0001260873(PQKBManifestationID)11742160(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001260873(PQKBWorkID)11312350(PQKB)10711508(MiAaPQ)EBC5491553(OCoLC)881398420(MdBmJHUP)muse33293(ScCtBLL)a159fbb8-70f0-4e1b-b9b7-8b3c4dfa6c5b(EXLCZ)99267000000056041620140226d2014 uy 0engurcnu||||||||txtccrEssential Vulnerabilities[electronic resource] Plato and Levinas on Relations to the Other /Deborah AchtenbergEvanston, Illinois :Northwestern University Press,2014.1 online resource (xii, 212 pages)Rereading ancient philosophyBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph0-8101-2994-9 Includes bibliographical references and index.Violence --Freedom --Creation --Knowledge --Time and the self --Violence, freedom, creation, knowledge --Glory and shine --Conclusion.In Essential Vulnerabilities, Deborah Achtenberg contests Emmanuel Levinas's idea that Plato is a philosopher of freedom for whom thought is a return to the self. Instead, Plato, like Levinas, is a philosopher of the other. Nonetheless, Achtenberg argues, Plato and Levinas are different. Though they share the view that human beings are essentially vulnerable and essentially in relation to others, they conceive human vulnerability and responsiveness differently. For Plato, when we see beautiful others, we are overwhelmed by the beauty of what is, by the vision of eternal form. For Levinas, we are disrupted by the newness, foreignness, or singularity of the other. The other, for him, is new or foreign, not eternal. The other is unknowable singularity. By showing these similarities and differences, Achtenberg resituates Plato in relation to Levinas and opens up two contrasting ways that self is essentially in relation to others.Rereading ancient philosophy.Self (Philosophy)Other (Philosophy)Electronic books. Self (Philosophy)Other (Philosophy)184Achtenberg Deborah1951-881974MdBmJHUPMdBmJHUPBOOK9910279736403321Essential Vulnerabilities1970149UNINA