04689nam 2200637 a 450 991022010600332120200520144314.01-281-18116-197866111811610-8330-4276-9(CKB)1000000000481456(EBL)322556(OCoLC)476120042(SSID)ssj0000254426(PQKBManifestationID)11229661(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000254426(PQKBWorkID)10208282(PQKB)10639209(Au-PeEL)EBL322556(CaPaEBR)ebr10225477(OCoLC)184844256(MiAaPQ)EBC322556(EXLCZ)99100000000048145620070329d2007 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrSustaining U.S. nuclear submarine design capabilities /John F. Schank ... [et al.]1st ed.Santa Monica, CA RAND Corp.20071 online resource (235 p.)Description based upon print version of record.0-8330-4160-6 Includes bibliographical references (p. 199-201).Cover; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Chapter One - Introduction; Problem and Objectives; Analytical Approach; Organization of This Monograph; Chapter Two - The Submarine Design Process; Evolution of the Nuclear Submarine Force; Submarine Design Phases; Mix of Skills Required to Design a Nuclear Submarine; Chapter Three - Framing the Analysis; Methodology for Analyzing Workforce ManagementStrategies; Estimating the Future Demand for Submarine DesignResources; Alternative Demand AssumptionsManaging the Submarine Design Workforce Requires aLong-Range ViewModeling Workforce Management Strategies; Summary; Chapter Four - Effect of Different Options for Managing Design Resources; Analyzing the Base Case; Impact of Different Design Start Dates; Implications of a Longer Design Duration; Implications of Splitting the Workload Between EB andNGNN; Sensitivity to Workforce Input Variables; Qualitative Impacts of the "Do Nothing" Option; Options for Sustaining Submarine Design Resources2; Summary and Conclusions; Chapter Five - Critical SkillsHow Many People in Each Skill Category Should BeMaintained?Factors to Consider When Deciding How Many of EachSkill Category to Sustain; Summary; Chapter Six - Suppliers; Introduction; Research Approach; Survey Results; Options to Address Vendor Risk; Observations; Chapter Seven - The Navy's Roles and Responsibilities in Submarine Design; Defining the Navy's Submarine-Related Roles; Program Authority Versus Technical Authority; Navy Design Resources; Summary; Chapter Eight - Effect of a Design Gap on the Navy's Technical Community; Effects of the Design Gap on NAVSEAEffects of the Design Gap on the Naval Warfare CentersEffects of a Stretched Design Program on Navy TechnicalResources; Summary; Chapter Nine - Conclusions and Recommendations; Appendix A - Workforce Simulation Model; Appendix B - Survey Instrument for Electric Boat and Northrop Grumman Newport News; Appendix C - Survey Instrument Provided to Vendors; Appendix D - U.S. Navy's Technical Warrant Holders; Appendix E - Net Present Value Analysis; BibliographyFor the first time since the design of the first nuclear submarine, the U.S. Navy has no nuclear submarine design program under way, which raises the possibility that design capability could be lost. Such a loss could result in higher costs and delays when the next submarine design is undertaken, as well as risks to system performance and safety. The authors estimate and compare the costs and delays of letting design capability erode vs. those of alternative means of managing the workload and workforce over the gap in design demand and beyond. The authors recommend that the Navy consider stretNuclear submarinesUnited StatesDesign and construction21st centuryShipbuilding industryEmployeesUnited States21st centuryNavy-yards and naval stationsUnited StatesNuclear submarinesDesign and constructionShipbuilding industryEmployeesNavy-yards and naval stations359.9/3Schank John F(John Frederic),1946-864820MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910220106003321Sustaining U.S. nuclear submarine design capabilities1930368UNINA