04543nam 2200613 a 450 991022007940332120230725025139.01-282-94053-897866129405380-8330-5078-8(CKB)2670000000048055(EBL)618720(OCoLC)649427239(SSID)ssj0000443966(PQKBManifestationID)12193422(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000443966(PQKBWorkID)10461740(PQKB)10175015(Au-PeEL)EBL618720(CaPaEBR)ebr10425065(MiAaPQ)EBC618720(EXLCZ)99267000000004805520100616d2010 uy 0engurcn|||||||||txtccrVictory has a thousand fathers[electronic resource] sources of success in counterinsurgency /Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clark, Beth GrillSanta Monica, Calif. RAND National Defence Research Institute20101 online resource (187 p.)"Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defence."0-8330-4961-5 Includes bibliographical references.Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE - Introduction; Purpose of This Study; Data and Analyses; About This Monograph and the Accompanying Case Studies; CHAPTER TWO - The Cases; Case Selection and Data Collection; Phased Data; Assessing Case Outcomes; Nicaragua (Somoza), 1978-1979; Afghanistan (Anti-Soviet), 1978-1992; Kampuchea, 1978-1992; El Salvador, 1979-1992; Somalia, 1980-1991; Peru, 1980-1992; Nicaragua (Contras), 1981-1990; Senegal, 1982-2002; Turkey (PKK), 1984-1999; Sudan (SPLA), 1984-2004Uganda (ADF), 1986-2000 Papua New Guinea, 1988-1998; Liberia, 1989-1997; Rwanda, 1990-1994; Moldova, 1990-1992; Sierra Leone, 1991-2002; Algeria (GIA), 1992-2004; Croatia, 1992-1995; Afghanistan (Post-Soviet), 1992-1996; Tajikistan, 1992-1997; Georgia/Abkhazia, 1992-1994; Nagorno-Karabakh, 1992-1994; Bosnia, 1992-1995; Burundi, 1993-2003; Chechnya I, 1994-1996; Afghanistan (Taliban), 1996-2001; Zaire (Anti-Mobutu), 1996-1997; Kosovo, 1996-1999; Nepal, 1997-2006; Democratic Republic of the Congo (Anti-Kabila), 1998-2003; Case Narrative ResultsCHAPTER THREE - Testing the Approaches to Counterinsurgency Representing the Approaches in the Data; Analysis of the Relationships Between Case Factors and Case Outcomes; Factor Stacks; Tests of Each Approach; Classic COIN Approaches; Contemporary Approaches to COIN; Insurgent Approaches; Summary of the Tests of the Approaches; CHAPTER FOUR - Broader Findings; Scorecard: Balance of Good Versus Bad Practices; Every Insurgency May Be Unique, but Not at This Level of Analysis; Which Successful Approach Is Most Essential? Qualitative Comparative Analysis; Phase OutcomesCHAPTER FIVE - Conclusions and Recommendations Key Findings; Effective COIN Practices Tend to Run in Packs; The Balance of Good Versus Bad Practices Perfectly Predicts Outcomes; Poor Beginnings Do Not Necessarily Lead to Poor Ends; Repression Wins Phases, but Usually Not Cases; Tangible Support Trumps Popular Support; APPENDIXES; A. Methods and Data; B. Details of Qualitative Comparative Analysis; C. Possible Criticisms of the Analyses and Response Commentary; ReferencesSUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL - Matrix of Factors Representing 20 Approaches to COIN and Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors Back CoverInsurgency is the most prevalent form of armed conflict and the subject of countless studies, yet the U.S. military has only recently begun to review doctrine and training in this area. An examination of approaches to counterinsurgency from 30 recent resolved campaigns reveals, for example, that good COIN practices tend to ""run in packs"" and that the balance of selected good and bad practices perfectly predicts the outcome of a conflict.CounterinsurgencyCase studiesCounterinsurgency355.02/18355.0218Paul Christopher905756Clark Colin P924025Grill Beth905757MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910220079403321Victory has a thousand fathers2073710UNINA