00833nam0-2200313---450-99000991390040332120141106113459.0978-1-84946-424-6000991390FED01000991390(Aleph)000991390FED0100099139020141106d2014----km-y0itay50------baengGB--------001yyInformation Rightslaw and PracticePhilip CoppelFourth EditionOxfordHart Publishing20141489 p.24 cm342.41066221itaCoppel,Philip524037ITUNINARICAUNIMARCBK990009913900403321X H 41056390FGBCFGBCInformation Rights831207UNINA01192nas 2200409 c 450 991089354570332120240201115232.010.11588/diglit.48028urn:nbn:de:hbz:061:1-28490urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-diglit-480283VD18 90281446(CKB)5280000000197399(DE-599)ZDB2586140-2(DE-101)1009100750(EXLCZ)99528000000019739920101215b17901792 |y |gerur|||||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrier˜Desœ Rheinischen Reichsvikariats-Hofgerichts Conclusaim Jahre .MünchenLentner1790-1792MünchenLudwig1790Online-RessourceVD18 digitalRheinischen Reichsvikariats-Hofgerichts Conclusa, Des ConclusaZeitschriftgnd-content3400061DE-1010016JOURNAL9910893545703321Rheinischen Reichsvikariats-Hofgerichts Conclusa4255841UNINA04027nam 2200649 a 450 991021999140332120240410072745.00-8330-3238-0(CKB)111056486374742(OCoLC)50763967(CaPaEBR)ebrary10505602(SSID)ssj0000128627(PQKBManifestationID)11991871(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000128627(PQKBWorkID)10069059(PQKB)10827901(Au-PeEL)EBL227864(CaPaEBR)ebr10505602(OCoLC)123109585(MiAaPQ)EBC227864(oapen)doab114496(EXLCZ)9911105648637474220010514h20012001 uy 0engurcn|||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierThe conflict over Kosovo why Milosevic decided to settle when he did /Stephen T. Hosmer1st ed.RAND Corporation2001Santa Monica, Calif. :Rand,2001.©20011 online resource (xxxi, 155 pages) illustrations, chartsProject Air Force series on Operation Allied Force"Prepared for the United States Air Force. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited."0-8330-3003-5 0-585-42538-8 Includes bibliographical references (p. 139-155).Introduction He assumed accepting Rambouillet terms would endanger his rule He assumed he could force NATO to offer better terms He realized that his hoped-for leverage on NATO had evaporated Bombing produced a popular climate conducive to concessions Damage to "dual-use" infrastructure generated growing pressure Damage to military forces and KLA "resurgence" generated little pressure He expected unconstrained bombing if NATO's terms were rejected He probably also worried about threat of future invasion He believed NATO's terms provided him with some political cover Concluding observationsThis report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Serbian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operationsProject Air Force series on Operation Allied Force.Why Milosevic decided to settle when he didKosovo War, 1998-1999Kosovo War, 1998-1999Kosovo War, 1998-1999.Kosovo War, 1998-1999.949.7103Hosmer Stephen T910140United States.Air Force.MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910219991403321The conflict over Kosovo2037070UNINA