02736nam 2200625 a 450 991021998300332120230120124311.01-283-22307-497866132230740-8330-5813-4(CKB)2550000000039887(EBL)730139(OCoLC)733496281(SSID)ssj0000575590(PQKBManifestationID)11354410(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000575590(PQKBWorkID)10550592(PQKB)11128505(Au-PeEL)EBL730139(CaPaEBR)ebr10482338(Au-PeEL)EBL4970024(CaONFJC)MIL322307(OCoLC)748214354(MiAaPQ)EBC730139(MiAaPQ)EBC4970024(EXLCZ)99255000000003988720110726d2011 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrCounterinsurgency scorecard[electronic resource] Afghanistan in early 2011 relative to the insurgencies of the past 30 years /Christopher PaulSanta Monica, Calif. RAND20111 online resource (27 p.)Occasional paperDescription based upon print version of record.0-8330-5248-9 Includes bibliographical references.Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Abstract; Findings from Previous Research on 30 Years of Insurgency1; The Counterinsurgency Scorecard; Scoring Afghanistan in 2011; Detailed Factors in the Current Case; Afghanistan in Comparison to Specific Historical Cases; Conclusions and Recommendations; Appendix; Details of the Expert Elicitation; The Delphi Method; The RAND Afghanistan Delphi Exercise; Raw Delphi Scores; ReferencesA core finding of previous RAND research on 30 years of insurgencies worldwide was that a conflict's overall score on a scorecard of 15 equally weighted good and 12 equally weighted bad counterinsurgency factors and practices perfectly predicted the ultimate outcome. Using the scorecard approach and an expert elicitation (Delphi) exercise, a RAND project sought to extend the findings to the case of Afghanistan in early 2011.Occasional paper (Rand Corporation)CounterinsurgencyAfghanistanCounterinsurgency355.02/184Paul Christopher905756Rand Corporation.National Defense Research Institute (U.S.)MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910219983003321Counterinsurgency scorecard2475709UNINA